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Abstract 
 
Reward is not a unitary construct but can be parsed into at least two dimensions: 
the motivational drive to seek out or work for rewards and the hedonic pleasure 
received from them. While animal studies suggest that these two dimensions can 
be dissociated and that they rely on separate neural and pharmacological systems, 
studies in humans have had mixed results. It is therefore unclear whether parsing 
reward into individual dimensions is helpful in informing our understanding of 
human reward processing. This thesis examines whether it is possible to 
dissociate the motivational wanting dimension and the hedonic liking dimension 
of reward behaviorally and neurally in healthy human volunteers. Moreover, it 
investigates how the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and striatum are involved in 
encoding these two dimensions, and how blocking the dopamine (DA) system 
influences reward encoding in general, as well as how blocking the DA and opioid 
system influences behaviors related to the motivational dimension of reward.   
In the first study, participants were asked to perform wanting and liking 
judgments of everyday consumer items while undergoing functional imaging, 
before and after playing a simple perceptual game in which they won half of the 
items. The results indicate that participants could differentiate wanting and liking 
and that our task was able to dissociate these two dimensions behaviorally:           
(1) liking judgments took significantly more time than wanting judgments, and (2) 
liking decreased specifically for lost items, while wanting decreased specifically 
for won items. Furthermore, the two reward dimensions were encoded differently 
in the brain: anatomically distinct areas in the PFC encoded either wanting or 
liking regardless of judgment type, while common areas in the striatum encoded 
both wanting and liking depending on which judgment the participant was 
currently performing. Lastly, connectivity between the anatomically distinct 
wanting and liking areas and the striatum differed depending on which judgment 
the participant was making. Connectivity between the striatum and liking regions 
in the PFC was enhanced according to the level of liking during liking judgments. 
In contrast, connectivity between the striatum and wanting regions in the PFC was 
enhanced according to the level of wanting during wanting judgments. This 
suggests that cortico-striatal pathways may play an important gating function by 
 iii 
flexibly encoding the specific reward dimension that is currently behaviorally 
relevant. 
The second study investigated neural encoding of reward in more detail, 
specifically focusing on how DA modulates reward encoding in the PFC. This was 
done by using a multivoxel pattern analysis technique to decode reward signals 
under DA blockade or placebo. Participants received either a D2-specific DA 
antagonist or a placebo pill approximately 1.5 hours before undergoing functional 
imaging of a non-instrumental outcome prediction task. D2-blockade led to 
enhanced encoding of reward related activity in the medial PFC: the decoding 
accuracy was significantly higher in subjects who had received the DA antagonist 
than in those that had received placebo. This suggests that blocking D2-DA 
receptors and biasing the system towards a D1 receptor dominated state 
enhances the stability of reward representations.  
The third study investigated the role of DA and opioid receptor 
pharmacology in two behaviors related to the motivational dimension of reward: 
reward impulsivity and cue-induced responding.  Participants received either a 
D2-specific DA antagonist, an unspecific opioid antagonist, or a placebo pill 
approximately three hours before completing a delay discounting task and a 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task. Both reward impulsivity, measured by the 
delay discounting task, as well as cue-induced responding, measured by the 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task, were reduced under DA and to a lesser 
extent under opioid blockade. These results are in line with animal studies 
demonstrating an effect of both dopamine and opioid modulation on the 
motivational dimension of reward.  
Overall, our findings suggest that reward can be parsed into separate 
dimensions in humans and that these dimensions differ in how they are encoded 
in the brain. Furthermore, both reward encoding in the brain and reward-related 
behaviors are modulated by DA and to some extent opioid pharmacology. Parsing 
reward into separate dimensions may be useful when considering psychiatric 
disorders marked by aberrant reward processing, as it allows for a more precise 
characterization of the deficits and may lead to more specific treatment and 
therapy approaches.  
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1. Introduction  
Reward is a fundamental driver of human behavior. Rewards motivate us to work, 
engage in relationships, procreate, eat, and learn, thereby shaping our everyday 
actions and plans. The subject of reward has been of interest to philosophers, 
religious thinkers, and scientists alike. Understanding how rewards influence 
behavior and how the human brain processes rewards has been debated since at 
least the first scientific definition of reward and its role in learning in Thorndike’s 
law of effect (1911), where a reward is described as something that leads to a 
“satisfying state of affairs” and in turn strengthens the association or connection 
between a stimulus and an instrumental response that led to that reward. Since then, 
the definition of reward has evolved and changed numerous times. Recent models 
of reward suggest that it may be useful to parse reward into separate psychological 
dimensions to better understand how these dimensions can work together, in 
parallel, or even in opposing directions to drive human behavior.  Two important 
dimensions that have been identified are the motivational drive to seek out rewards 
and the hedonic pleasure obtained from them. These dimensions are often 
correlated but can be dissociated by modulating dopamine (DA) and opioid levels.  
Dopamine is a key neurotransmitter involved in reward processing. Many 
drugs of abuse, monetary gains, and even positive social interactions, activate the 
mesolimbic DA system. However, while it is clear that DA is important for reward 
processing and learning, its exact role is still debated. In this dissertation, I will 
present three studies (see Appendices) that investigate the neural as well as 
neurochemical underpinnings of reward, with emphasis on whether reward in 
humans can be decomposed into separate dimensions and how these dimensions 
are encoded in the brain. I will then discuss further which neurotransmitter systems 
are likely involved. In study 1, I tested whether reward can be dissociated 
behaviorally and neurally into hedonic and motivational dimensions, and 
furthermore, how the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and striatum encode these two 
dimensions. In study 2, I examined how reward information, in general, is encoded 
in the PFC and how this encoding is modulated by DA. Finally, in study 3, I explored 
the neurochemical underpinnings of reward in more detail, by investigating the role 
 2 
of DA and opioid receptor pharmacology in reward impulsivity and cue-induced 
responding. 
 In the first introductory chapter, I will provide a brief overview of reward 
processing in humans, and touch upon aberrant reward processing in psychiatric 
disorders. I will describe the putative dimensions of reward, describe the 
neurobiology underlying reward, explain how the DA and opioid systems are 
hypothesized to be involved in reward processing, and lastly give an overview of the 
role of maladaptive reward processing in disease. The second chapter will 
summarize the three studies, which investigated reward using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI; study 1), pharmacology and fMRI (study 2), and 
pharmacology and behavior (study 3). Finally, the third chapter will conclude with 
a general discussion of the results.  
 
1.1 Parsing reward into separate dimensions 
 Many theories have attempted to explain what motivates individual 
behavior. One of the earliest, the drive reduction theory, suggests that behaviors 
result from a biological or physical imbalance in needs and the urge (drive) to regain 
a state of homeostasis (Hull, 1943; Mowrer, 1960; Spence, 1956). For example, when 
a person is hungry they will act in a way to reduce the discomfort of being hungry. 
However, while this theory can explain simple behaviors driven by intrinsic forces, 
it is not able to explain behaviors that arise when all biological needs are met, 
increased motivation in the presence of reward-predicting cues, or 
overconsumption of rewarding foods and liquids. Other theories that also rely on 
intrinsic internal drives, such as arousal theory (Hebb, 1955) or instinct theory 
(Freud, 1933), have similar shortcomings.  
Early incentive motivation theories filled this void by proposing an alternative 
description of behavior, where behavior is motivated primarily by external rewards 
and outside incentives (Bindra, 1974; Bindra, 1978; Bolles, 1972; Toates, 1986). 
According to incentive motivation theories, stimuli can produce and shape 
behaviors if they have motivational or incentive properties. They obtain these 
properties by being paired with unconditioned rewards. This happens often in 
everyday life, for example when the smell of food is consistently paired with its 
 3 
consumption, after a while the smell alone may produce or increase hunger and 
consequently food seeking behavior. Notably, a key idea of these theories is that the 
amount of effort exerted or the amount of motivation exhibited to obtain a reward 
is directly proportional to the amount of pleasure the individual receives from the 
reward. According to these theories, a hungry individual will act to reduce hunger 
and will do so with more vigor and/or speed in the presence of cues (such as odor 
or visual stimuli) that were previously paired with pleasantly tasting food. For a long 
time, this view of reward dominated, with reward considered a unitary construct, in 
which different dimensions of reward – such as the drive to seek out rewards and 
the pleasure received from them – were so thoroughly integrated that they were 
used interchangeably.  
However, this unitary, hedonic view of reward under incentive motivation 
theories was challenged later on. For example, Berridge, Robinson, and colleagues 
performed a series of rodent experiments, which indicated that the motivational and 
hedonic dimensions of rewards are not always aligned (Berridge and Robinson, 
1998; Robinson and Berridge, 1993). They could show that blocking the mesolimbic 
DA system through lesions resulted in a stark reduction of instrumental (motivated) 
behavior while leaving hedonic pleasure reactions largely unaffected (Berridge and 
Robinson, 1998). Similarly, increasing the level of DA increased the drive of the 
animal to seek out rewards (instrumental behavior), while leading to no comparable 
increase in hedonic responding (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000). In contrast, 
modulating the endogenous opioid system, specifically in small hot spots in the 
nucleus accumbens (NAc) and the pallidum, modified hedonic pleasure reactions 
(Castro and Berridge, 2014; Mahler et al., 2007; Smith and Berridge, 2007). In sum, 
the incentive salience theory proposed by Berridge and colleagues parses reward 
into at least two dimensions, the motivational wanting dimension of reward that 
drives instrumental behavior and is largely dependent on the mesolimbic DA 
system, and the hedonic liking dimension of reward that is related to the pleasure 
received from the reward and is largely dependent on the endogenous opioid 
system. These two dimensions differ in their anatomy and pharmacology, and can 
under certain circumstances be driven in opposing directions (i.e. when a reward is 
wanted but not liked or vice versa).  
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While the incentive salience theory has been tested and supported in 
numerous animal experiments, in humans the picture is less clear. Some evidence in 
favor of it comes from patients with clinical disorders marked by a deregulation of 
the DA system. In these patients, wanting of rewards is at times disconnected from 
liking of rewards. For example, Sherdell and colleagues (2012) considered the role 
of wanting and liking in mitigating depression. They asked both healthy controls and 
currently depressed participants to rate how much they liked a series of cartoons 
and assessed wanting by measuring the amount of effort they were willing to exert 
to view a cartoon. As expected, in the control group liking of the cartoon was 
strongly correlated with the amount of effort that the participant was willing to 
exert. In contrast, for the depressed group, liking did not predict subsequent effort 
levels. In line with this, Ostafin and colleagues (2010) found that in at-risk alcohol 
drinkers, those that had a long history of drinking exhibited a dissociation between 
liking ratings of an alcoholic drink and the amount they subsequently consumed. 
The correlation between the two measures was decreased compared to participants 
with a shorter history of drinking. These dissociations between wanting and liking 
in clinical disorders support the idea of separate reward dimensions in humans.  
However, other studies have provided conflicting evidence for parsing 
reward into motivational and hedonic dimensions. Some studies have offered 
supporting results: Similar to animal studies, stress induction can increase cue-
triggered wanting of an olfactory reward in healthy human participants, without a 
similar increase in pleasure ratings (Pool et al., 2015). Furthermore, DA levels in the 
ventral striatum (VS) are more strongly correlated with subjective “wanting” ratings 
of a reward than with subjective pleasure or “liking” ratings of the same reward 
(Leyton, 2002; Evans et al., 2006). Similarly, reducing DA levels reduces cue- and 
cocaine-induced cravings related to wanting without decreasing the reinforcing 
euphoria more closely related to liking (Leyton et al., 2005), in line with the notion 
that the DA system is preferentially involved in reward-related motivation rather 
than hedonics. However, contradictory findings also exist: Barrett and colleagues 
(2004) report a correlation between DA levels and the pleasurable, euphoric drug 
effects in smokers, and not with self-reported craving. Tibboel and colleagues 
(2011) failed to find any dissociation between wanting and liking using implicit 
measures. This has led some researchers to strongly challenge the idea of separate 
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motivational and hedonic reward dimensions, especially for food rewards 
(Havermans, 2011, 2012).  
Conflicting results of studies investigating different reward dimensions in 
humans may due to several methodological reasons. One shortcoming of many of 
these studies is their operationalization of wanting and liking (Pool et al., 2016). 
Many studies do not use the same measure for determining wanting and liking, 
making it difficult to form direct comparisons. Any differences in wanting and liking 
reported by those studies could, therefore, be due to differences in the measurement 
instrument, instead of the reward dimension. Secondly, the common use of food 
rewards may be problematic, as wanting and liking of foods is so intrinsically 
connected that it could be difficult for study participants to dissociate these two 
constructs (Havermans, 2011, 2012). Lastly, studies using drug rewards and 
measuring craving as well as euphoric drug effects have very low sample sizes, often 
with less than 10 subjects. It is therefore still a matter of debate whether human 
reward can be decomposed into specific dimensions and if these dimensions differ 
in their neural anatomy and pharmacology.  
 
1.2 Neural processing of reward 
As reward processing is made up of several complex sub-processes – including 
anticipation, planning to attain, experiencing, as well as updating the relative value 
of a reward – a myriad of brain regions is recruited and involved. For this thesis, I 
will focus specifically on reward encoding and restrict myself to investigating the 
primary anatomical target regions of DA: the striatum and the PFC.  
 In the past decades, considerable interest has focused on how rewards are 
encoded in the human brain. One consistent finding is that a multitude of different 
rewards – from primary rewards, such as foods and drugs, to secondary rewards, 
such as money or consumer goods – activate a shared network of brain regions, 
especially the PFC and striatum (Bartra et al., 2013; Peters and Buechel, 2010). A 
key question is how these different types of rewards and complex situations are 
represented in the brain to compute value signals that inform choices. For example, 
how does the brain encode and compare the choice between eating a delicious 
cookie and going jogging – two very different reward categories?  How can the same 
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reward, such as a chocolate bar, have different value representations depending on 
whether someone is hungry or satiated? How are different aspects of a reward 
encoded in the brain of an addict who has a strong craving and desire for a drug, 
even though this drug will not provide him with high levels of pleasure? All these 
questions illustrate the complexities involved in reward encoding, which needs to 
account both for features of the reward (such as size, pleasantness, attractiveness, 
and health benefit) and the current state of the individual (such as metabolic and 
physiological variables, and mood). 
A key brain region involved in reward encoding is the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The vmPFC is typically active during decision making 
tasks and signals in the vmPFC scale with the value of the presented items or 
outcomes, with increasing value increasing vmPFC activity and decreasing value 
decreasing vmPFC activity (Plassmann et al., 2010; Tom et al., 2007).  Notably, the 
vmPFC encodes rewards in an abstract, general manner, allowing for comparisons 
of rewards of different reward categories. For example, the subjective value of food 
items, consumer items, as well as monetary rewards are all encoded in an 
overlapping region in the vmPFC (Chib et al., 2009). An adjacent region to the one 
reported by Chib and colleagues also encodes both the subjective value of charitable 
donations (Hare et al., 2010), as well as food rewards (Hare et al., 2008; Plassmann 
et al., 2007). Studies using multivariate pattern classifiers on fMRI signals of 
different reward categories have recently substantiated these findings. Using signals 
from the vmPFC, classifiers trained on the value of food rewards are able to decode 
the value of non-food consumer goods (McNamee et al., 2013), and neural patterns 
in the vmPFC related to reward information of faces correlate with neural patterns 
in the vmPFC related to reward information of places (Pegors et al., 2015). Signals 
in the vmPFC have not only been shown to be category-independent but also 
identity-independent: classifiers trained on the value of a specific savory food odor 
are able to decode the value of a specific sweet food odor (Howard et al., 2015; 
Howard and Kahnt, 2017). Notably, this general encoding of rewards in the vmPFC 
occurs even in the absence of decision-making tasks, when only incentive cues of 
different reward categories are presented (Kim et al., 2011). Identity- and category-
general (or common currency) encoding of reward signals has been replicated 
consistently in numerous studies (Chib et al., 2009; Howard et al., 2015; Kim et al., 
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2011; Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy and Glimcher, 2011; Lin et al., 2012; McNamee et 
al., 2013; Plassmann et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2010, see also the meta-analysis by 
Levy and Glimcher, 2012). It seems that the vmPFC may, therefore, be important in 
encoding reward for comparisons across reward categories. 
 A second important region for neural reward encoding is the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), which is often implicated in tasks involving goal-directed behavior and 
reward processing. The OFC can be functionally divided into lateral, central and 
medial OFC (Kahnt et al., 2012). Just like in the vmPFC, signals in the medial OFC 
have been shown to be category- and identity-independent, and different rewards 
are encoded on a similar scale (Chikazoe et al., 2014; Klein-Flügge et al., 2013, see 
also the meta-analysis by Levy and Glimcher, 2012). This is not surprising, given the 
overlap of vmPFC and medial OFC. However, in contrast to the general reward 
encoding in the medial OFC, signals in the lateral OFC are identity-specific (Howard 
et al., 2015; Boorman et al., 2016; Howard and Kahnt, 2017; Klein-Flügge et al., 2013; 
Sescousse et al., 2010). In other words, different rewards are encoded differently in 
the lateral OFC even if they are valued the same. For example, the same level of 
subjective value of a certain sweet and a certain savory odor are encoded in unique 
patterns in the lateral OFC. A pattern classifier trained on value signals of one 
rewarding odor is not able to accurately decode the value of a different but equally 
rewarding odor type (Howard et al., 2015). Another key aspect of reward encoding 
in the lateral OFC is that signals are modulated by the current physiological state of 
the individual. This can be investigated using devaluation paradigms, in which 
participants are sated on a specific appetitive reward to reduce its subjective value. 
Both animal (Gallagher et al., 1999; Murray et al., 2015; Rhodes and Murray, 2013; 
Rudebeck et al., 2013) and human studies (Gottfried et al., 2003; Howard and Kahnt, 
2017) have shown that the OFC is involved in devaluation: Animals with OFC lesions 
continue to seek out devalued rewards. In humans, devaluation changes the 
identity-specific reward signals of a sated odor in the lateral OFC. In sum, the OFC 
encodes reward both in an identity-specific, as well as common-scale manner, 
including information about the organism’s current state.     
 Besides the vmPFC and OFC, the striatum is another region that is vital for 
reward encoding. As with the vmPFC, reward encoding in the striatum is thought to 
occur in a more general manner. Activity in the striatum scales with reward value 
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for both gains and losses (Tom et al., 2007), as well as for different reward categories 
(Levy and Glimcher, 2012). Sescousse and colleagues (2010) had male participants 
experience either monetary or erotic rewards. Their results indicated that in 
contrast to reward-specific signals in the lateral OFC, the striatum commonly 
encoded both monetary and erotic rewards, suggesting a more general processing 
of reward in this region. Similar results of common value signals in the striatum have 
been found for monetary and social rewards (Izuma et al., 2008, 2010), as well as 
monetary and juice rewards (Valentin and O'Doherty, 2009). Furthermore, activity 
in the striatum scales with the subjective value of both social and monetary reward-
predicting cues (Rademacher et al., 2010; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009), as well as for 
both erotic and monetary reward-predicting cues (Sescousse et al., 2015), even in 
the absence of decision making.  
 Taken together, through both general reward signals and identity-specific 
reward signals in the PFC and striatum, the brain can encode and compare rewards 
from multiple categories on a common scale while maintaining important reward 
specific information. Critically, it seems that neural signals encode both value 
information, as well identity information about rewards. One subsequent question 
is therefore: is reward dimension-specific information also encoded in the PFC or 
striatum?  
As reward can be parsed into individual psychological dimensions – the 
motivational dimension and the hedonic dimension – it seems probable that these 
two dimensions are also encoded in the PFC and/or the striatum. While the OFC has 
been proposed as a key component of the pleasure network in the human brain 
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015), the striatum has been implicated in processing 
appetitive, motivational value signals in both human and non-human animals. In 
rodents, studies have demonstrated increases in instrumental responding for 
rewards after DA modulation in the VS (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000). Furthermore, 
McGinty and colleagues (2013) recorded cue-evoked neuronal firing to reward-
predicting cues in the VS and found that the recorded signals were directly related 
to the reward-seeking behavior as well as the vigor and speed of subsequent 
instrumental responding. In humans, Schmidt and colleagues (Schmidt et al., 2012) 
found that activity in the striatum was related to how much cognitive or physical 
effort participants exerted in order to receive a reward. In line with this, Sescousse 
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and colleagues (2015) showed that response times to reward-predicting cues were 
negatively correlated to the striatal activity elicited by these cues. Together, the 
emerging framework relates the OFC more closely to pleasure and the hedonic 
dimension of reward, whereas the striatum appears more involved in processing 
incentive value that drives behavior, so more closely related to the motivational 
dimension of reward.  
However, this straightforward picture of prefrontal processing of hedonic 
reward dimensions and striatal processing of motivational reward dimensions is 
complicated by several studies reporting activity related to pleasure in the striatum 
(Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Rolls et al., 2008), as well as those reporting activity 
related to incentive motivation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), including the 
OFC and vmPFC (Arana et al., 2003; Kringelbach, 2005). These seemingly 
contradictory findings may not be surprising, given that the hedonic and 
motivational dimensions of reward are typically aligned and most studies do not 
control for the other dimension.  
In their review in 2010, Peters and Buechel highlight the diversity of findings 
related to neural reward processing, and thereby also provide evidence of 
limitations in dissociating wanting from liking. Peters and Buechel report that both 
activity related to liking, which they refer to as outcome value, as well as activity 
related to wanting, which they refer to as goal value and decision value, have been 
found in the OFC and vmPFC. Activity in the striatum has been related to both 
outcome values and decision values. However, the variability in methodology among 
the reviewed papers introduces issues of interpretability regarding findings of 
wanting and liking in humans. The studies differed vastly in both the reward types 
that were used, as well as in the measure of value that was employed. While liking 
(outcome value) studies typically used sensory rewards, such as music, olfactory, or 
gustatory rewards that were experienced immediately, wanting (goal/decision 
value) studies typically used either food or monetary rewards which were delivered 
post task. Secondly, while liking studies used ratings to measure the hedonic value, 
wanting studies mostly used a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction or choice 
tasks to measure goal or decision value. These systematic differences in reward type 
(sensory primary rewards vs secondary rewards), in reward timing (immediate 
consumption vs post task delivery), as well as in reward measure (ratings vs 
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BDM/choice tasks), make comparisons between wanting and liking nearly 
impossible. This is further complicated by the fact that, as mentioned previously, 
past studies generally investigated only one dimension without controlling for the 
other.  
 
1.3 The dopamine system and reward 
DA plays an important role in the reward system. Midbrain DA neurons are 
associated with reward prediction, reward prediction error, reward anticipation, as 
well as reward receipt. Increases in DA release have been observed for pleasant 
music (Salimpoor et al., 2011), monetary (Koepp et al., 1998; Zald et al., 2004), and 
drug rewards (Brody et al., 2004; Drevets et al., 2001; Volkow et al., 1996), as well 
as for cues associated with these rewards (Volkow et al., 2006). The majority of DA 
cell bodies locates in the ventral midbrain (particularly the ventral tegmental area 
(VTA) and substantia nigra), from where the axons diverge to several terminal areas 
in the forebrain and cortex. Thereby, DA can modulate the cortico-striatal loops as 
part of the basal ganglia circuit (Graybiel and Grafton, 2015; Haber, 2014). Together, 
the mesolimbic and nigrostriatal DA system as well as limbic and cortical areas, 
including the VS, dorsal striatum, OFC, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), form a 
reward circuit (Goldstein and Volkow, 2002; Haber and Knutson, 2010). 
Extracellular DA acts by binding to pre- and postsynaptic DA receptors. DA 
receptors are most abundantly found in the striatum (Dawson et al., 1986), but also 
occur in the PFC (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Lidow et al., 1989; Seamans and 
Robbins, 2010). Broadly speaking, there are two types or families of DA receptors: 
D1 and D2. These two receptor types differ in two key properties: (1) While D1-DA 
receptors function in an excitatory manner, increasing the likelihood of neuronal 
firing, D2-DA receptors function in an inhibitory manner, reducing the likelihood of 
neuronal firing (Surmeier et al., 2007); and (2) while D1-DA receptors are more 
sensitive to phasic changes in DA levels, i.e. to shorter burst activity, D2-DA 
receptors are more sensitive to tonic DA levels, i.e. to continuous activity (Dreyer et 
al., 2010).  
One prominent theory of prefrontal DA functioning, the dual-state theory, 
harnesses the different properties of D1 and D2 receptors. According to this theory, 
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the type of DA receptors that are preferentially activated may play an important role 
in neural processing (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008): When neural networks are in 
a D1-dominated state, cognitive representations are more stable, whereas neural 
networks in a D2-dominated state are more flexible. This is in line with studies 
indicating that D2-DA receptor function plays a critical role in tasks that require 
flexible behaviors, such as attentional set shifting and response flexibility, in both 
animals (Floresco et al., 2006; Goto and Grace, 2005) and humans (Mehta et al., 
2004; Tost et al., 2006, but see also Luciana and Collins, 1997; Mehta et al., 2001 for 
conflicting results). D1 receptors, on the other hand, are critical for successful 
performance in working memory tasks (Abi-Dargham et al., 2002; Constantinidis 
and Klingberg, 2016; Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991). However, the exact 
function of the D1- and D2-DA receptors, especially with respect to reward 
processing, has remained elusive. 
 In contrast to dual-state theory, incentive salience theory (like other 
frameworks) takes a more holistic perspective on DA functioning. It emphasizes DA 
as an integral part of the motivational dimension of reward. In this view, 
motivational salience of stimuli and consequent increases in motivation intensity 
brought about by reward cues, are generated by the mesolimbic DA system and the 
mesocorticolimbic reward circuit. As discussed in section 1.1, numerous animal 
experiments have provided evidence of modulations of the incentive salience of 
rewards and subsequent modulations in reward-seeking behaviors following both 
tonic and phasic DA level fluctuations. However, it is important to note that there 
are also prominent alternative interpretations of the role of DA in reward 
processing, which emphasize the role of DA in subjective value processing, in reward 
prediction error processing and reward learning (Salamone and Correa, 2002; 
Schultz, 1998; Wise, 1982). 
 
1.4 The opioid system and reward  
Less is known about the exact role of the opioid system in reward. In general, the 
opioid system comprises three types of receptors: mu, delta, and kappa opioid 
receptors. These receptors are activated by endogenous opioid peptides in response 
to rewarding stimuli (van Ree et al., 2000). Opioid receptors are distributed 
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throughout the brain, with highest concentrations in the cortex, limbic system and 
brainstem (LaMotte et al., 1978; Le Merrer et al., 2009; Mansour et al., 1987; 
Mansour et al., 1988).  
Functionally, the opioid system has been linked to reward and reinforcement 
more generally. Endogenous opioid release in the VS has been observed following 
painful as well as pleasant events (Szechtman et al., 1981; Zubieta et al., 2001). In 
animals, opioid receptor activation in spatially restricted hotspots within the 
pallidum and NAc leads to increased pleasure reactions (Smith and Berridge, 2007). 
In line with this finding, in humans opioid antagonism leads to a reduction in 
pleasantness ratings of sweet solutions (Arbisi et al., 1999; Fantino et al., 1986), as 
well as a reduction in hedonic responses to food items (Drewnowski et al., 1995; 
Yeomans and Gray, 1996, 1997). The opioid system is also involved in the 
reinforcing effects of drugs of abuse (Contet et al., 2004; Kieffer and Gavériaux-Ruff, 
2002; Le Merrer et al., 2009; Nutt, 1999). However, whether opioid agonists and 
antagonists influence reward processing directly through the opioid system or 
indirectly through opioid-DA interactions is still a matter of debate.  On the one 
hand, studies using DA-depleted mice indicate that in opioid-naïve animals 
activating midbrain mu opioid receptors can produce reward signals and lead to 
learning, suggesting that DA is not necessary for this (Hnasko et al., 2005). On the 
other hand, the DA and opioid system are closely connected anatomically 
(Khachaturian and Watson, 1982). Pharmacologically, opioid antagonists can block 
DA release induced by alcohol or feeding (Benjamin et al., 1993; Taber et al., 1998), 
and opiates are able to indirectly disinhibit and excite DA neurons (Chartoff and 
Connery, 2014; Johnson and North, 1992; Luscher and Malenka, 2011; Nutt, 1999). 
In turn, DA modulation influences opioid levels, with phasic DA leading to increases 
in opioid levels (Roth-Deri et al., 2003). Lastly, in humans who have a genotype that 
affects dopaminergic neurotransmission, the response of the opioid system is also 
altered. Zubieta and colleagues (2003) found higher regional density of mu-opioid 
receptors in participants with enhanced activity of the dopaminergic system due to 
a genetic variation in the catechol-O-methyltransferase gene. Taken together it is, 
therefore, possible that the rewarding effects of opioids are generated by 
interactions between the DA and opioid system, instead of the opioid system alone. 
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1.5 Aberrant reward processing  
Maladaptive reward processing is associated with numerous psychiatric disorders, 
including substance use disorders, depression, eating disorders, behavioral 
addictions, affective disorders, and schizophrenia (Arias-Carrion et al., 2010; Davis 
et al., 2009; Grace, 2016; Romer Thomsen et al., 2014; Zald and Treadway, 2017). 
Deficits can present as reduced reward sensitivity, apathy or anhedonia, or as 
increased reward responding, excessive goal-related activity or increased reward 
impulsivity. These types of deficits can be observed in tasks related to reward 
processing, such as those measuring responding to reward-related cues or requiring 
inhibition of impulses to attain higher rewards.  
 Patients suffering from disorders marked by maladaptive reward processing 
typically also suffer from deregulation of the DA or opioid system. Such deregulation 
can be aptly illustrated using the example of drug addiction. Patients suffering from 
substance abuse often exhibit neural changes in the mesolimbic DA and opioid 
system. Prolonged drug use can cause both sensitization of the DA system by 
increasing DA release, as well as tolerance by decreasing the sensitivity of DA 
receptors and by reducing the expression of DA receptors (Berke and Hyman, 2000; 
Volkow et al., 2009). Notably, while tolerance mechanisms are usually able to 
recover quickly, neural sensitization is much more permanent and can continue for 
years (Dalia et al., 1998; Kalivas and Duffy, 1993; Paulson et al., 1991). At the neural 
level, incentive sensitization, i.e., greater DA reactivity to drugs as well as cues 
associated with drug use, is considered a strong factor in inducing cravings and 
contributing to relapse (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Robinson and Berridge, 
2001, 2008). Prolonged drug use also modifies endogenous opioids and opioid 
receptors (Waldhoer et al., 2004). However, how exactly changes in the opioid 
system contribute to drug craving and relapse is still unclear. 
Linking difficulties in reward processing to changes in the DA or opioid 
system is of great interest to those trying to understand how addiction develops as 
well as why there is such a high incidence of relapse. Understanding how DA and 
opioid pharmacology influences tasks involving reward processing may help 
illuminate how these neurotransmitter systems are involved in diseases marked by 
aberrant reward processing, and in turn, these insights may allow for the 
development of potentially new and more specific treatments. Furthermore, they 
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may help fine-tune psychotherapy techniques which aim at improving reward-
related deficits, such as behavioral activation therapy, future-directed therapy, and 
motivational interviewing (Zald and Treadway, 2017). 
Aberrant and healthy motivational effects of reward-associated stimuli can 
be measured with cue-induced responding. Cue-induced responding refers to the 
ability of a previously learned Pavlovian cue to elicit instrumental behavior even in 
the absence of reward and even when the Pavlovian cue was never paired with the 
instrumental response directly. The idea is that the Pavlovian cue has acquired 
incentive salience and this allows it to induce and increase instrumental responding. 
Cue-induced responding is used as a model for drug craving mechanisms underlying 
relapse and may also be applicable to overeating or other forms of excessive reward 
seeking (Johnson, 2013; Lamb et al., 2016; Smith and Robbins, 2013). 
Cue-induced responding is typically measured by Pavlovian-instrumental 
transfer (PIT) tasks. These tasks have a three-stage design consisting of a Pavlovian 
conditioning phase, an instrumental conditioning phase, and a transfer test. In an 
initial Pavlovian conditioning phase, a specific Pavlovian cue is paired with a reward. 
After successful Pavlovian conditioning, the instrumental conditioning phase begins. 
Here a particular instrumental response increases the probability of a reward and 
the participant learns this association. Lastly, a transfer test takes place under 
extinction conditions, i.e. without the presentation of any rewards. Here, 
instrumental responding is measured both in the absence and in the presence of the 
Pavlovian cue. In animal models, as well as healthy human volunteers, the Pavlovian 
cue will reinstate or increase instrumental responding in the transfer test phase 
relative to baseline (Lamb et al., 2016). 
Patients suffering from psychiatric disorders linked to deficits in reward 
processing often exhibit altered cue reactivity. Drug-dependent, overweight and 
obese individuals have stronger neural signals in response to drug or food related 
cues respectively (Smith and Robbins, 2013). Furthermore, increased cue reactivity 
in patients suffering from substance abuse, especially increased neural reactivity to 
drug cues, is associated with an increased relapse risk and resistance to treatment 
(Courtney et al., 2016). In contrast, cue reactivity is reduced in subjects undergoing 
treatment as opposed to those actively using drugs, especially in those reporting a 
high motivation to reduce their drug use (Prisciandaro et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 
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2004). Pharmacologically, cue-induced responding has been linked to both the DA 
(Dickinson et al., 2000; Ostlund and Maidment, 2012; Peciña et al., 2006; Wassum et 
al., 2011; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000) and the opioid system (Laurent et al., 2012; 
Peciña and Berridge, 2013) in several animal studies, but it remains unclear if this 
is also the case in humans. 
An alternative measure for motivational reward functions is reward 
impulsivity. Reward impulsivity is defined as the inability to delay gratification and 
wait for a larger reward in the face of a smaller immediate reward (Dalley and 
Robbins, 2017). Increased reward impulsivity may be a reason why drug use is 
started and maintained (Wit, 2009), as the immediate reward of the drug is valued 
more than distant long-term rewards, such as intact relationships, stable income, or 
good health. This form of impulsivity may also play a role in explaining other 
disorders marked by maladaptive reward processing, such as eating or gambling 
disorders. 
Reward impulsivity is often measured by delay discounting (DD) tasks, in 
which participants are asked to make a series of choices between larger, later 
rewards and smaller, immediate rewards. The ability to wait for larger later rewards 
has been linked to a number of positive life outcomes and beneficial life skills, 
including academic and financial success, good health, better ability to deal with 
stress and adversity, and higher self-esteem. In turn, increased reward impulsivity 
is associated with an increased risk for substance use disorders and higher rates of 
obesity (Mischel et al., 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). 
Like in cue-induced responding, patients with substance use disorders often 
display elevated reward impulsivity (Bickel et al., 2011; Coffey et al., 2003; Havranek 
et al., 2017; Hulka et al., 2014). Furthermore, increased reward impulsivity is related 
to higher drug consumption and lower treatment success (Brody et al., 2014; 
Washio et al., 2011). However, it is unclear whether this is caused by the drug use 
per se or if this is a personality trait that predisposes one to substance use. 
Pharmacological studies of reward impulsivity have shown an involvement of both 
the DA (Floresco et al., 2008; Pine et al., 2010, 2010; Wit et al., 2002) and opioid 
system (Kieres et al., 2004; Love et al., 2009; Pattij et al., 2009) in reward 
impulsivity.  
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2. Overview of the studies  
Understanding how reward is processed in the brain, as well as what 
neurotransmitters are involved, is crucial for elucidating normal as well as 
maladaptive decision-making. As we have seen, evidence primarily from past animal 
research, but also from human research, suggests that reward can be parsed into at 
least two dimensions: a motivational dimension and a hedonic dimension. 
Furthermore, it seems that these different reward dimensions also differ in their 
neurochemical underpinnings, with DA playing an important role in the 
motivational dimension of reward while leaving the hedonic dimension of reward 
largely unaffected. While the hedonic dimension is not influenced by modulations of 
the DA system, it does respond to changes in the endogenous opioid system. We, 
therefore, used both functional imaging as well as pharmacological approaches to 
investigate the two reward dimensions in more detail and test the role of the two 
different neurotransmitter systems involved. 
In study 1, we conducted an fMRI experiment to test whether human reward 
processing can be dissociated behaviorally and neurally into motivational and 
hedonic dimensions. Additionally, we investigated how reward signals are encoded 
in the PFC and striatum and how reward information may be transferred from the 
cortex to the striatum in cortico-striatal loops. After establishing that both 
motivational and hedonic dimensions of reward are encoded in the PFC, we 
investigated these reward signals in more detail in study 2. Here we manipulated 
DA pharmacologically, to understand how DA antagonism affects reward encoding 
in the PFC. Lastly, in study 3, we studied the motivational aspect of two reward-
related behaviors outside of the scanner – cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity – after applying DA or opioid pharmacology. 
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2.1 Study 1: Fronto-striatal pathways gate processing of 
behaviorally relevant reward dimensions 
 
Background 
To direct behaviors appropriately and make rational decisions, it is important to 
accurately evaluate rewards obtained from those decisions. The VS and PFC are two 
key areas involved in reward processing of primary, secondary, as well as social 
rewards (Bartra et al., 2013). The VS both receives input from the mPFC and the OFC, 
and indirectly projects to the OFC and ACC via the pallidum, the substantia nigra, 
and the thalamus (Haber, 2014). However, while the involvement of the VS in 
reward processing is clear, it is still uncertain how it encodes reward and how it 
channels behaviorally relevant reward information.  
To probe whether the VS encodes only behaviorally relevant reward 
information, we used a task that separates reward into motivational wanting and 
hedonic liking dimensions. As described in detail in section 1.1, animal studies have 
consistently shown that these two dimensions can be differentiated neurally, with 
wanting relying mainly on the mesolimbic DA system and liking relying on the 
endogenous opioid system. Importantly, both wanting and liking engage spatially 
overlapping parts within the VS. If the VS acts as a gatekeeper, encoding the 
behaviorally relevant information, then reward-related activity in the VS should 
reflect the specific reward dimension that is important to direct behavior at that 
time. In this case, activity in VS should be associated with wanting during wanting 
judgments and with liking during liking judgments. In contrast, if the VS processes 
reward in a parallel manner, both wanting and liking dimensions should be engaged 
during wanting and liking judgments, with the two dimensions activating 
dissociable areas within the VS. 
 
Methods 
We asked twenty-eight right-handed participants (14 females) to rate forty 
everyday items in the fMRI scanner according to how much they wanted and liked 
them. Participants first saw a cue indicating the type of rating trial (1s), followed by 
an image of an item (3s), and finally the rating screen (3.5s) (Appendix 1, Figure 1). 
Ratings were provided on a continuous scale using a trackball. Trials were separated 
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by a variable inter-trial-interval (mean 3s). Each item was rated twice for wanting 
and twice for liking, resulting in 160 trials split into 4 runs.  The ratings in the 
scanner were collected twice – once before and once after the participants played a 
perceptual game in which they won half of the items (each item was randomly 
assigned to win or lose). The game allowed us to separate wanting and liking more 
strongly, while also making the task more engaging.  
Preprocessing and analysis of the fMRI data was done with the statistical 
parametric mapping software suite (SPM8). The raw fMRI time series were 
realigned, coregistered, segmented, normalized, and smoothed with a Gaussian 
kernel with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 4 mm. To extract wanting and 
liking related neural activity, we used two parametric general linear models (GLMs). 
The first model pooled data from both wanting and liking trials and included one 
onset regressor for every trial with three parametric modulators, the mean (over 
the two repetitions of the same object) wanting rating, the mean liking rating, and 
the response time. The second model separated wanting and liking judgments and 
consisted of one onset regressor for the wanting judgments and one onset regressor 
for the liking judgments. Both onset regressors were modulated by the same three 
parametric modulators as in the first GLM (mean wanting rating of the item, mean 
liking rating of the item, and response time). Head movements were included as 
nuisance regressors in both parametric GLMs. We performed a whole brain 
parametric analysis, as well as a region of interest (ROI) and psychophysiological 
interactions (PPI) analysis.  
 
Results and conclusions 
We found that after winning and losing the items, wanting and liking ratings 
changed in opposite directions. While wanting decreased specifically for won items 
and remained constant for lost items, the opposite was true for the liking ratings, 
which decreased specifically for lost items and remained unchanged for won items. 
Interestingly, the response times for the two judgment types also differed, with 
liking judgments taking significantly longer than wanting judgments. Together, this 
indicates that our subjects differentiated between the two judgment types.  
Wanting and liking differed on the neural level as well. We found that 
wanting ratings were related to frontal activity, including parts of the medial OFC 
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and ACC/mPFC, as well as VS. In contrast, liking-related activity was more focal and 
limited to the central OFC, posterior cingulate, pallidum, and VS. This is in line with 
past rodent studies linking the VS to wanting and liking, and implicating the 
pallidum primarily in liking (Smith and Berridge, 2007; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000). 
Furthermore, we found that while the wanting and liking-related signals in the VS 
were overlapping and common to both reward dimensions, those in the OFC and 
mPFC were spatially segregated and specific to either wanting or liking.  
We were particularly interested in how the striatum and PFC encode 
behaviorally relevant reward. Specifically, we asked whether these regions switch 
between the wanting and liking dimensions of reward according to the dimension 
being expressed in the current judgment. For the OFC, wanting and liking related 
reward signals were present regardless of judgment type. The wanting ROIs in the 
medial OFC encoded wanting ratings during both wanting and liking judgments. 
Similarly, the liking ROIs in the central OFC encoded liking ratings regardless of 
judgment type. In contrast, activity in the VS expressed one or the other rating as a 
function of the judgment type that the participant had to perform. Thus, signals in 
the VS reflected the liking ratings during liking judgments and the wanting ratings 
during wanting judgments. These data indicate that unlike prefrontal reward 
encoding regions, striatal value encoding regions flexibly switch to encode the 
reward dimension that is currently behaviorally relevant.  
We next asked whether the differential encoding pattern in the VS and PFC 
would also translate into differential connectivity between the VS and the prefrontal 
liking and wanting ROIs depending on the type of judgment that the participant was 
making. Using a PPI analysis, we found that in fact, during liking judgments, the 
connectivity between the VS and the liking ROI in the OFC was stronger for the liking 
rating than the wanting rating. This was reversed for the wanting judgments, where 
the connectivity between the VS and the wanting ROI in the mPFC was stronger for 
the wanting rating than the liking rating. 
In sum, we demonstrated that the PFC processes reward in a more automatic, 
parallel manner, while the VS acts as a gate, processing what is currently relevant 
for behavior. By using a task that asked participants to rate well-established 
dimensions of reward, we could show that while the PFC encodes wanting and liking 
dimensions in a spatially dissociated fashion, irrespective of judgment type, one and 
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the same VS region encodes only what is currently behaviorally relevant to the 
participant. This value selection function is implemented by a stronger connectivity 
for the liking ratings than the wanting ratings between the VS and the liking regions 
in the central OFC during liking judgments, as well as stronger connectivity for the 
wanting ratings than the liking ratings between the VS and the wanting regions in 
the mPFC during wanting judgments. 
 
2.2 Study 2: Dopamine D2-Receptor Blockade Enhances Decoding 
of Prefrontal Signals in Humans 
 
Background 
The PFC plays an important role in goal-directed behavior, learning and decision 
making. To accomplish this role, it is vital for reward-related information to be 
represented and maintained in the PFC for later use. However, it is still largely 
unclear how the PFC implements such a representation. Past studies suggest that DA 
may play a key role in modulating prefrontal representations (Cools, 2011), and the 
dual-state theory offers a physiologically plausible computational model that 
describes the effects of DA on the PFC neurons in a receptor-specific manner: In the 
D2-dominated state, network representations are weaker than in the more stable 
D1-dominated state, making them more prone to interference and disruption, but 
also allowing for greater flexibility, as several weak network representations can 
exist simultaneously (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Seamans and Robbins, 2010). 
In line with this theory, D2 receptor blockade – favoring a D1-dominated state – 
should enhance PFC representations of reward, by inhibiting concurrent 
representations of distractors. This, in turn, should result in more stable and 
enhanced network representations.  
In this study, we used a D2-specific DA antagonist to probe whether D2 
receptor blockade results in enhanced network representations of rewards in 
humans. We used a multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) technique to decode reward 
signals from the PFC. We hypothesized that blocking D2 receptors would lead to 
enhanced network representations which would allow for enhanced decoding of 
neural reward patterns through MVPA, i.e. greater decoding accuracy.  
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Methods 
We conducted a between subject, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled 
fMRI study to investigate whether D2-DA receptor blockade enhances decoding of 
reward signals in the OFC. Fifty-one male subjects (placebo group n=24, amisulpride 
group n=27) performed a non-instrumental outcome prediction task approximately 
1h 30min after receiving either a placebo pill or 400mg amisulpride. Amisulpride is 
a selective D2/D3-DA receptor antagonist and the dosage used in this study usually 
results in ~50–80% D2 receptor occupancy. To enhance and equate absorption of 
the drug across participants, all participants were instructed not to eat for at least   
6 h before arriving on the day of the study. During the task, participants saw four 
visual cues, two of which were always associated with reward (0.20 Swiss Franc 
(CHF)) and two of which were never associated with reward (0.00 CHF). The visual 
cues were counterbalanced across subjects and the outcomes were presented either 
as images of coins or as numerical digits, in order to avoid interference from visual 
features of the cue-outcome pairs. This resulted in two stimulus sets (I and II), each 
consisting of a visual cue predicting reward and a visual cue predicting no reward 
and either the resulting coin or numerical outcome image.  
Before scanning, subjects completed one training session in order to learn 
the cue-outcome associations. After the training session, participants were placed in 
the fMRI scanner and the non-instrumental outcome prediction task started. This 
task comprised five runs, with 10 presentations of each cue-outcome pair. For each 
presentation, the visual cue was displayed for 0.6s, after which participants had 1.5s 
to indicate what they anticipated the upcoming outcome (reward or no reward) to 
be, followed by the outcome (1s), and a variable inter-trial interval with a mean          
of 3.5s.  
We used linear support vector classification (SVC) combined with a 
searchlight approach, to decode reward representations, i.e. representations 
associated specifically with reward as opposed to no reward. This MVPA technique 
can detect response patterns that are condition specific and can be classified as 
reward trials or no reward trials through pattern recognition algorithms.  
Using unsmoothed data, we first estimated a GLM containing four regressors 
for the onset of each of the four cue-outcome pairs, as well as six head movement 
regressors of no interest. The parameter estimates of the four regressors of interest, 
 22 
corresponding to the response amplitude to each of the four cue-outcome pairs, 
were then used as inputs to a subject-wise linear SVC analysis combined with a 
searchlight-decoding approach (searchlight sphere 10mm radius). In an initial step, 
using only stimulus set I, the SVC model was trained to classify patterns of the 
parameter estimates for reward vs. no reward trials. Subsequently, the SVC model 
was tested only on stimulus set II, to acquire the cross-validated decoding accuracy. 
These two steps were repeated with training on stimulus set II and testing on 
stimulus set I. We then took an average of both decoding accuracies, which gave us 
a measure of the locally distributed reward information of the center voxel of the 
searchlight. Repeating the training and testing for every possible center voxel 
resulted in a subject-wise, whole-brain 3D map of decoding accuracies. On the 
group-level, these subject-wise 3D maps were smoothed with a Gaussian Kernel of 
6mm FWHM and entered into voxelwise two-sample t-tests comparing the placebo 
and amisulpride groups.  
We also performed a conventional univariate analysis on the smoothed time 
series fMRI data. For this analysis, we used the same first-level design matrix 
comprised of the onsets for the four cue-outcome pairs and six movement 
regressors of no interest. For every subject, linear contrast images were computed 
for reward minus no reward and then taken to the group-level analyses where we 
used two-sample t-tests to compare the placebo and amisulpride groups. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Behaviorally, both groups could learn the cue-outcome associations during the 
training session and continued to perform well during the five runs in the fMRI 
scanner. There were no group differences in learning or performance parameters 
such as the percentage of correct responses, learning rate, or response times. This 
allowed us to compare the neural reward signals between the two groups without 
potentially confounding differences in behavior or learning.  
Our results confirm the hypothesis that D2 receptor blockade leads to a 
reduction of the D2-mediated weakening of prefrontal representations and an 
enhancement of the pattern separation between reward and no reward. This was 
reflected by an in increased decoding accuracy in the amisulpride group. 
Specifically, the OFC showed significantly higher decoding accuracy in the 
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amisulpride group compared to the placebo group. Using an independent ROI 
analysis in anatomically defined subregions of the OFC (medial, central, and lateral 
OFC), we found that higher decoding accuracy, increased pattern separation, as well 
as greater pattern consistency across time, was exhibited specifically in the medial 
OFC, and not in lateral or central OFC ROIs.  
Notably, the univariate analysis did not find any significant change in the 
mean signal for the contrast reward minus no reward in the OFC. While an 
exploratory univariate analysis detected elevated activity in response to reward 
cues in the VS in the amisulpride group, it seems that the prefrontal effect of 
amisulpride is more subtle, with enhanced decoding of reward information by 
increasing pattern separation and pattern consistency over time, independent of a 
change in the mean signal.  
Lastly, in a post-hoc analysis, we found that amisulpride also enhanced the 
decoding accuracy of specific motor responses in D2 receptor dense motor areas, 
such as the left pre-motor (Brodmann area 6) and primary motor cortex. In contrast, 
there was no such increase in decoding accuracy for regions with fewer D2 
receptors, such as in early visual areas. 
 
2.3 Study 3: Dopamine D2/3- and μ-opioid receptor antagonists 
reduce cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity in humans 
 
Background 
Many disorders characterized by maladaptive reward processing, such as substance 
use disorders, are also marked by deficits in the DA or endogenous opioid system 
(Robinson and Berridge, 2008; Zald and Treadway, 2017). The incentive salience 
theory proposes that reward can be parsed into motivational and hedonic 
dimensions and that the DA and opioid systems differentially modulate these two 
dimensions (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Robinson and Berridge, 1993). While the 
motivational dimension of reward, related to approaching the reward and working 
to attain the reward, relies mainly on the mesolimbic DA system, the hedonic 
dimension, which is related to the pleasure received from the reward, relies mainly 
on the endogenous opioid system. Numerous animal studies, as well as several 
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human studies, have provided support for this parsing scheme, and the incentive 
salience theory is one potential model of reward learning used to explain drug 
addiction and relapse (Robinson and Berridge, 2008).  
Behaviorally, individuals with aberrant reward processing, such as patients 
with substance use disorders, often show deficits in tasks involving cue-induced 
responding and reward impulsivity (Dalley and Robbins, 2017; Lamb et al., 2016). 
Both these deficits may underlie high relapse rates and the difficulty in treating 
these disorders. Increased reactivity to drug-related cues may explain craving and 
drug taking after encountering Pavlovian cues linked with drug use even after 
prolonged successful abstinence. Increased reward impulsivity may explain the 
inability to resist the short-term reward of taking drugs, even in the face of long-
term costs to health, finances, and relationships.  
Several studies have provided data consistent with the idea that cue 
reactivity and reward impulsivity are strongly linked to drug use, maintenance and 
relapse. Patients struggling with addiction often show increased cue-induced 
responding and this increased reactivity to reward-associated cues is linked to 
treatment failure (Courtney et al., 2016). Similarly, reward impulsivity is also 
associated with an increased risk of addictive behavior as well as relapse (Brody et 
al., 2014; Mischel et al., 2011; Washio et al., 2011).  
Both cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity are more closely 
related to the motivational dimension of reward than the hedonic dimension. 
However, past studies investigating these behaviors and their DA and opioid 
pharmacology have been done primarily in animal models and offer conflicting 
results regarding the pharmacological basis of cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity (Appendix 3, Table 1). We were therefore interested in how the DA and 
opioid system influence these behaviors in healthy human volunteers. Using a 
between-subject double-blind placebo-controlled pharmacological intervention, we 
investigated how a DA and an opioid blocker influenced cue-induced responding 
and reward impulsivity in healthy volunteers. We hypothesized that as cue-induced 
responding and reward impulsivity are associated with the motivational wanting 
dimension of reward, DA antagonism would reduce these two behaviors. As recent 
work has also found wanting modulations by the opioid system (Peciña and 
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Berridge, 2013), we expected the opioid antagonist to similarly reduce both of these 
behaviors. 
 
Methods 
In total 121 participants (placebo group n=40, amisulpride group n=41, naltrexone 
group n=40) participated in our study. Approximately 3 hours before the 
experimental tasks, participants swallowed a pill containing either placebo, 400mg 
amisulpride, or 50mg naltrexone. As described in study 2, amisulpride is a selective 
D2/D3-DA receptor antagonist and at the chosen dosage we expect approximately 
50–80% D2 receptor occupancy. Naltrexone, on the other hand, is an unspeciﬁc 
opioid receptor antagonist that acts primarily on the μ- and κ-opioid receptors, with 
lesser and more variable effects on δ-opioid receptors. At the chosen dosage 
naltrexone is expected to result in >90% μ-opioid receptor occupancy. The dosages 
were chosen to induce comparable neurochemical responses while minimizing 
potential side effects. To further enhance and equate absorption of the drugs across 
participants, all participants were asked not to eat for at least 6 h before the start of 
the study. 
Participants completed two tasks: a PIT task and a DD task. The PIT task was 
composed of three phases: an instrumental conditioning phase, a Pavlovian 
conditioning phase, and a transfer test phase. First, during the instrumental 
conditioning phase, participants learned to press a button to receive chocolate 
rewards. As performance improved, the reward schedule was adjusted until the 
performance was stable on a variable-ratio 10 schedule. Next, during the Pavlovian 
phase, an appetitive Pavlovian conditioned stimulus (CS+) was always paired with 
the receipt of a chocolate reward, while a neutral stimulus (CS-) was always paired 
with no outcome. Finally, in the transfer-test phase, participants encountered both 
the CS+ and the CS- in the absence of any rewards. During this phase, no chocolate 
rewards were dispensed and button pressing was recorded while the CS+ and the 
CS- were presented twice for 10 s in random order. To measure hunger levels, 
participants indicated their desire for chocolate before and after the task on a visual 
analog scale. 
To measure DD, participants were asked to complete the Kirby (1999) 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire. This questionnaire is made up of 27 hypothetical 
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decisions in which participants select between a smaller, immediate monetary 
reward and a larger, delayed monetary reward. For immediate rewards, the rewards 
varied between 11 CHF and 80 CHF; for delayed rewards, the rewards varied 
between 25 CHF and 85 CHF. The delays varied between 7 and 186 days.  
To control for demographic or personality differences, we also collected 
information about trait impulsivity through the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-
11), about differences in the Behavioral Inhibition and the Behavioral Activation 
System scales through the short version of the Action Regulating Emotion Systems 
questionnaire, and about affective responsiveness through the Affect Intensity 
Measure. Additionally, we measured BMI, and asked the participants about their age 
and education level, as well as assessed mood, in order to assess whether these 
factors may modulate our findings.  
 
Results and Conclusions 
The three groups did not differ in age, BMI, years of education, affect 
intensity, reward sensitivity or trait impulsivity. There were also no significant 
differences in their desire for chocolate or their learning performance during the 
Pavlovian and instrumental phases of the PIT task.  
As expected cue-induced responding during the transfer test of the PIT task 
and reward impulsivity during the DD task were modulated by the pharmacological 
intervention. Both the DA and the opioid blocker led to a reduction in cue-induced 
responding during the transfer test phase of the PIT task. While the placebo group 
showed significant increases in the number of button presses at CS+ presentation 
and a significant difference between button pressing during the CS+ and the CS- 
presentation (corresponding to PIT), these effects were abolished in the two drug 
groups. Neither the amisulpride nor the naltrexone group showed increased 
responding to the CS+ compared to the CS-, and both groups differentiated 
significantly less between the two CSs than the placebo group.  
The DD results were similar, albeit a bit more nuanced. Here we found that 
the DA blocker significantly reduced reward impulsivity compared to the placebo 
group. The opioid blocker also reduced reward impulsivity in comparison to the 
placebo group, but this reduction was not significant.  
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Lastly, in an explorative analysis, we examined the modulatory effect of mood 
on motivated behavior. Our results indicate that blocking the DA and opioid system 
differentially affected the association between mood and reward impulsivity. In the 
DA antagonist group, reward impulsivity correlated with positive mood, while in the 
opioid antagonist group, reward impulsivity correlated with negative mood. 
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3. General Discussion 
3.1 Efficient encoding of reward dimensions in the PFC and VS 
One approach to understanding reward processing and the circuitry involved is to 
parse reward into individual psychological dimensions. While animal studies have 
provided evidence that reward can be split into at least two dimensions – a hedonic 
dimension and a motivational dimension – human studies have been less definitive. 
In study 1 (Appendix A), we, therefore, investigated whether it is possible to 
dissociate these two reward dimensions in humans both behaviorally and neurally. 
We were able to demonstrate that it is possible, and that distinct regions in PFC 
consistently processed wanting (mPFC) or liking (central OFC) irrespective of which 
judgment type was being expressed whereas one common region in the striatum 
encoded one dimension or the other according to behavioral relevance.  
Study 1 measured both liking and wanting in one task using identical rating 
scales. In contrast to previous studies in humans and animals (Pool et al., 2016), this 
allowed us to compare wanting- and liking-related responses directly. Most studies 
have used cue reactivity (Heinz et al., 2004), craving (Dagher et al., 2009; Heinz et 
al., 2004; McClernon et al., 2009), or hunger and pleasantness ratings (de Araujo et 
al., 2003; Kringelbach et al., 2003; Spetter et al., 2012) as measures of wanting and 
liking. These studies either did not control for the other reward dimensions or used 
different measures for each dimension. Accordingly, any of the findings could be 
related to either wanting or liking or to differences in how wanting and liking were 
measured. Our study substantially improves on the methodology used to assess and 
dissociate the two reward dimensions and allows us to investigate them in a more 
thorough and effective manner.  
In the PFC, we observed anatomically distinct encoding of the two reward 
dimensions regardless of current behavioral requirements. While central OFC 
activity encoded liking, more medial parts of the OFC and PFC encoded wanting. The 
central OFC receives numerous inputs with visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and 
somatosensory information (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). These sensory inputs 
could provide a basis for hedonic reward encoding. In contrast, the medial OFC is 
closely connected with the limbic system (Carmichael and Price, 1995), which in 
turn is often implicated in diseases marked by increased desire and wanting, such 
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as addiction, and has been described as the “impulsive system” (Bickel et al., 2007; 
Everitt and Robbins, 2005).  Our data indicate that these distinct regions continue 
to process the motivational or hedonic value dimensions also when the present 
behavior is not based on them.  
Compared to the PFC, in the VS, encoding of wanting and liking was 
anatomically less segregated and functionally more flexible, i.e. dependent on what 
judgment the participant was currently performing. This is in line with numerous 
animal studies demonstrating that wanting and liking share neural substrates in the 
anterior VS, with liking engaging spatially restricted areas overlapping with more 
distributed regions recruited by wanting (Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Berridge et 
al., 2009; Castro and Berridge, 2014). Critically, we find that encoding of reward 
dimensions in the VS flexibly switches according to what judgment is currently 
being evaluated. This may be a mechanism by which the striatum can reduce the 
cortical information it receives through cortico-striatal loops, and more efficiently 
pass on only the currently required information.  
Reward processing in the striatum may be organized according to a dorsal-
ventral divide. Popular implementations of actor-critic models (Houk et al., 1995) 
suggest that the dorsal striatum is important for motor and cognitive control, is a 
key player in the learning of stimulus-response associations, and plays the role of 
the actor by modifying stimulus-response associations in order to increase long-
term gains (O'Doherty et al., 2004). In sum, it is critical for action selection. In 
contrast, the VS is thought to act as the critic and to be important for updating 
reward predictions (O'Doherty et al., 2004). Our findings speak to this divide, by 
suggesting that in parallel to the dorsal striatum’s role in action selection, the VS 
may be key in performing value selection, by filtering value signals and passing on 
only information about the reward dimension that is currently relevant. 
Lastly, we found that cortico-striatal connectivity strength depended on both 
the type of judgment that the participants were currently performing, as well as the 
level of wanting and liking. During liking judgments, functional connectivity 
between the VS and the central OFC was more strongly related to levels of liking 
than levels of wanting. In contrast, during wanting judgments, functional 
connectivity between the VS and the mPFC was more strongly related to levels of 
wanting. This could be a way in which activity in the VS can flexibly switch between 
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encoding hedonic and motivational reward dimensions depending on behavioral 
relevance: Functional connectivity between the VS and the specific cortical region 
encoding the relevant reward dimension is enhanced proportional to the level of the 
specific reward dimension.  
In sum, our study reveals that wanting and liking of nonconsumable rewards 
in healthy humans can be dissociated both behaviorally and neurally, with wanting 
encoded in the medial OFC, mPFC, and VS, and liking encoded in the central OFC, 
posterior cingulate, VS, and pallidum. More importantly, we show that in contrast to 
the PFC, the VS encodes wanting or liking depending on which dimension is 
behaviorally relevant in the present situation. Thus, striatal processing of 
motivational and hedonic reward dimensions appears to be dynamic and 
particularly sensitive to ongoing behavioral requirements. Finally, the coupling 
between the VS and frontal regions differed according to which judgment type was 
behaviorally relevant, suggesting a gating function of fronto-striatal connectivity for 
different reward dimensions.  
 
3.2 Dopamine modulates the stability of reward representations in 
the PFC 
In study 2 (Appendix B), we explored reward encoding in the PFC in more detail. 
Specifically, we were interested in probing what the role of DA is in stabilizing and 
enhancing prefrontal value representations. According to the dual-state theory of 
prefrontal cortical networks (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Seamans and Robbins, 
2010), the stability as well as the flexibility of prefrontal network patterns is 
influenced by whether the PFC is in a D1-dominated state or in a D2-dominated 
state. The D1-dominated state is characterized by robust and stable network 
patterns; however, it is also marked by a high energy barrier between different 
network states, which makes representations more rigid and inflexible. In contrast, 
the D2-dominated state is characterized by fast and flexible switching between 
network patterns, due to a much lower energy barrier; however, this makes 
representations much weaker, noisier, and less stable. In study 2, we thus aimed to 
probe whether value representations in the PFC are encoded in line with the 
hypotheses from the dual-state theory.   
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We used a D2-DA receptor antagonist to induce a D1-dominated state in our 
participants while they performed a simple non-instrumental outcome-prediction 
task. To decode reward signals from the PFC we used an MVPA technique. This 
allowed us to look for evidence of enhanced network representations, which would 
result in enhanced decoding of neural reward patterns through MVPA. Consistent 
with the dual-state theory, we found that compared to placebo, participants who 
received the D2-antagonist exhibited enhanced reward representations. For the 
reward signals in the PFC of participants receiving the DA antagonist, there was 
significantly higher decoding accuracy, a greater pattern separation between the 
activity patterns related to reward and no reward trials, as well as a greater pattern 
consistency across time. This dopaminergic enhancement in the stability of reward 
representations was specific to medial parts of the OFC (related to wanting 
according to study 1; see below) and was not observed for central OFC (related to 
liking according to study 1).  
Evidence for the dual-state theory comes primarily from animal work, but 
has also been supported in humans: Several studies have shown that blocking D2 
receptors in the PFC impairs set shifting tasks (Floresco et al., 2006; Tost et al., 2006; 
Mehta et al., 2004), suggesting that the D2-system may be necessary for switching 
between alternatives. The flexibility of the network patterns in the D2-system 
would, in this case, allow for efficient updating of information, as well as allow for 
rapid switching between different representations, which in turn may facilitate 
successful performance in these types of tasks.  
In contrast, D1 receptors are critical for working memory performance (Abi-
Dargham et al., 2002; Constantinidis and Klingberg, 2016; Sawaguchi and Goldman-
Rakic, 1991), suggesting that the D1-system may be necessary for preserving mental 
representations during delays. This could occur through the stable and robust 
network patterns in D1-dominated states, which protect representations from 
disturbance by noise or competing, distracting stimuli. Our finding of enhanced 
decoding of reward representations in the mPFC in a D1-dominated state is in line 
with these studies. Furthermore, by using multivariate analyses, our results suggest 
that a D1-dominated state stabilizes prefrontal reward representations at the level 
of distributed patterns (rather than more globally as with the univariate effects in 
the striatum).  
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The fact that we observe enhanced encoding accuracy of reward 
representations in medial OFC, and not in lateral or central OFC, is interesting 
considering the OFC results of study 1. The medial OFC identified in study 2 largely 
overlaps with wanting-related activity in the medial OFC in study 1. This could 
indicate that signals used to decode reward representations in study 2 may be most 
closely related to the motivational dimension of reward. Past studies have found 
mPFC activity that scales according to monetary gains and losses (Tom et al., 2007), 
as well as according to monetary bids on liked and disliked foods (Plassmann et al., 
2010). It may be that using monetary stimuli elicits primarily wanting-related 
activity in the PFC, given the fact that it cannot be consumed and therefore is less 
directly associated with liking. However, given that the wanting signals in study 1 
were much stronger than the liking signals, an alternative explanation is that liking-
related activity in the central OFC was not decoded simply because of insufficient 
statistical power.  
One limitation of our findings is that recent work suggests that parametric 
statistical tests may not be optimal for analyzing common measures of accuracy in 
MVPA methods (Allefeld et al., 2016; Stelzer et al., 2013). In study 2, we used the 
percentage of correct classifications as a measure of decoding accuracy. As 
described in detail in the methods in section 2.1, as well as Appendix 2, we 
determined the decoding accuracy of every voxel in the brain and performed group 
statistics using traditional t-tests. However, as decoding accuracy may not always be 
normally distributed and as the samples are not drawn from a continuous 
distribution, but from one bounded by zero and 100, key assumptions of the t-
statistic may not be met. Furthermore, work by Stelzer and colleagues (2013) 
suggests that non-parametric statistics may have higher statistical sensitivity and 
that parametric statistics may inflate the number of false positives. It may, therefore, 
be useful to additionally use non-parametric statistics on our data, such as by 
conducting permutation testing, to validate our results.  
In conclusion, using DA pharmacology and MVPA techniques, we could show 
that putting participants in a D1-dominated state enhanced decoding of prefrontal 
reward representations. This was further validated by demonstrating that 
participants in a D1-dominated state had a stronger pattern separation and a greater 
 33 
pattern consistency across time. Our results thereby provide evidence for a role of 
the DA system in modulating the stability of reward representations in the PFC. 
 
3.3 DA and opioid antagonism reduces cue-induced responding 
and reward impulsivity 
Study 3 (Appendix C) further explored the pharmacological basis of motivational 
aspects of reward. Here, we considered the role of both DA and opioid pharmacology 
in two specific reward-related behaviors: cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity. We found that both cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity 
were reduced under DA blockade, and to a lesser extent under opioid blockade. 
Furthermore, DA and opioid antagonists differentially affected the relationship 
between mood and reward impulsivity: Reward impulsivity under DA blockade 
correlated with positive mood. In contrast, reward impulsivity under opioid 
blockade correlated with negative mood.  
Our dopaminergic effects on cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity 
are in line with most animal studies and extend them to humans. Decreased PIT has 
been observed after inactivation of the VTA (Corbit et al., 2007; Murschall and 
Hauber, 2006) and administration of DA receptor antagonists (Dickinson et al., 
2000; Lex and Hauber, 2008). In turn, increased PIT can be seen following 
administration of the indirect DA agonist amphetamine (Peciña et al., 2006; Wyvell 
and Berridge, 2000). Similarly, administration of the indirect DA agonists 
amphetamine and cocaine leads to increases in reward impulsivity (Evenden and 
Ryan, 1996; Helms et al., 2006; Logue et al., 1992, but see Wade et al., 2000 for 
contradicting results). Our findings suggest that DA plays a similar role in humans. 
There have been fewer studies looking at dopaminergic effects on cue-
induced responding and reward impulsivity in humans, and those that exist have all 
struggled with small sample sizes. One study investigated cue-induced responding 
in healthy volunteers and found that unspecific DA depletion reduces cue-induced 
responding for reward-associated cues (Hebart and Gläscher, 2015). By using a 
receptor type-specific intervention, our findings qualify and extend those of Herbart 
and Gläscher. Human studies investigating reward impulsivity have shown 
contradictory or null effects (Hamidovic et al., 2008; Pine et al., 2010; Wit et al., 
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2002). Using a larger sample size, our results provide evidence that similar to 
animals, both these reward behaviors are modulated by DA antagonism in healthy 
human volunteers.  
Reduced cue-induced responding after DA blockade is consistent with the 
framework of the incentive salience theory proposed by Berridge and colleagues 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998). According to this theory, reward is not a unitary 
concept but can be parsed into separable dimensions. For instance, the motivational 
drive to obtain rewards (wanting) can be separated from the hedonic pleasure 
associated with them (liking) (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015; Castro and Berridge, 
2014; Pool et al., 2016). Animal studies have shown that motivational wanting and 
hedonic liking of reward can be differentiated neurochemically. While wanting 
relies mainly on the mesolimbic DA system, liking is mediated by the endogenous 
opioid system (Castro and Berridge, 2014). Since cue-induced responding is one 
common way to measure wanting of rewards, its reduction under DA antagonism is 
in line with DA’s primary role in modulating wanting.  
Both cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity were also reduced, 
although to a lesser extent, under opioid blockade. This is consistent with past 
studies investigating PIT (Laurent et al., 2012; Myrick et al., 2008; Peciña and 
Berridge, 2013), while prior studies investigating reward impulsivity offer mixed 
and inconsistent results (Boettiger et al., 2009; Kieres et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 
2007). Notably, the results of our study suggest that the opioid system is involved in 
modulating the motivational dimension of reward, as measured by cue-induced 
responding. Modulation of wanting through manipulations of the opioid system has 
been observed in the past (Castro and Berridge, 2014; Peciña, 2008; Peciña and 
Berridge, 2013). However, due to the close interrelation between the DA and opioid 
system, it is difficult to determine conclusively whether the effect on wanting is 
driven solely by modulation of the opioid system or by interactions between the 
opioid and DA systems.  
Lastly, we find that the relationship between mood and reward impulsivity 
was differentially affected by the drug group. Specifically, we found that in the DA 
antagonist group there was a positive relationship between mood and reward 
impulsivity: Participants that reported higher positive mood also acted more 
impulsively. In contrast, we found that in the opioid antagonist group this 
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relationship was reversed: Participants that reported higher positive mood acted 
less impulsively. This may indicate that mood should be considered when 
prescribing medications to reduce symptoms of enhanced reward impulsivity. 
Patients with low moods may benefit more from DA antagonists than opioid 
antagonists and vice versa. However, since our mood measure was only taken at the 
end of the study with no baseline comparison, it is a relatively crude measure. Future 
studies are necessary to replicate our findings and confirm this interaction effect of 
drug, mood, and impulsivity.  
Taken together, our results of decreased cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity under both DA and opioid blockade are largely in line with previous 
animal studies and extend them to humans. This suggests that both the DA and the 
opioid system are involved in processing motivational dimensions of reward as 
described in the incentive salience theory. Additionally, our findings of stronger 
reductions in both behaviors under DA antagonism implies that it may be most 
promising to focus on the DA system when treating disorders marked by 
maladaptive reward processing. Finally, it may be worthwhile to take a closer look 
at inter-individual differences, such as in mood, when studying the pharmacological 
basis of reward processing, to gain a more fine-tuned understanding of how 
individual patients may respond to different treatments.  
 
4. General Conclusions 
Numerous studies in the past decade have investigated how rewards are processed 
in the brain. Notably, many different types of rewards, be it primary, secondary, or 
even social rewards, and numerous types of tasks, from passive viewing to decision 
making, have produced surprisingly similar results. Searching the brain for activity 
that scales either with the size of the reward or the participant’s subjective valuation 
consistently identifies the OFC, mPFC, VS, and posterior cingulate (Grabenhorst and 
Rolls, 2011; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Platt and Huettel, 
2008; Rushworth, 2008; Wallis, 2011). However, how the vast amount of reward-
related information is encoded in the brain is still largely unclear.  
Our results shed light on this question and provide evidence for one potential 
mechanism how different reward dimensions may be efficiently encoded in the 
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brain. Study 1 suggests that different dimensions of reward are encoded in the PFC 
in an anatomically segregated manner regardless of task demand. Study 2 provides 
evidence of dopaminergic enhancement of the stability of prefrontal reward 
representations. Taken together, this could suggest that the PFC is important in 
encoding reward dimensions in parallel, and that DA (especially the D1-system) 
ensures the stability and robustness of these segregated signals. Subsequently, only 
behaviorally relevant prefrontal value signals may be passed on to cortico-striatal 
pathways, allowing for an effective way to reduce the complexity of the reward 
information that reaches the VS. Through enhanced connectivity between the VS and 
those cortical areas encoding the currently relevant reward dimension, only the 
presently required reward information is processed further.  
The idea that the PFC, and especially the OFC, may be functionally organized 
according to specific reward dimensions, valence, or tasks, is not new. Both monkey 
recording and human imaging studies have indicated that there is a medial-lateral 
divide in the OFC. Most evidence suggests the OFC is organized according to a 
valence gradient, with medial OFC processing affectively positive stimuli and 
rewards, and lateral OFC processing affectively negative stimuli and punishments 
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Liu et al., 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2001). However, 
alternative accounts have also been proposed, such as that the organization of the 
OFC may rely on the type of value computation that is being performed (Rich and 
Wallis, 2014). Our findings inform this debate by providing evidence that the OFC 
may be important for encoding different reward dimensions in anatomically distinct 
regions, and that DA may function as a stabilizer to maintain robust and separate 
prefrontal reward representations.   
In our last study, we took a closer look at two reward-related behaviors: cue-
induced responding and reward impulsivity. Both cue-induced responding and 
reward impulsivity are thought to contribute to the initiation and maintenance of 
compulsive behaviors, as well as to relapse after treatment or therapy. We find that 
both DA and opioid pharmacology modulates cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity: Blocking DA or opioid receptors leads to a reduction in reward seeking 
and impulsive behavior. Considering our previous results regarding neural reward 
encoding, it could be that putting subjects in a D1-dominated state, which leads to 
enhanced and stable reward signals, drives these effects. Especially concerning 
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reward impulsivity, these enhanced and stable signals may make it easier for 
subjects to detect the highest value alternative without being distracted by the 
attractiveness of short time delays.   
In conclusion, our results suggest that reward information is encoded in 
distributed and separate areas in the PFC and that only behaviorally relevant reward 
information is represented in the VS. Furthermore, the D1-DA system may enhance 
the stability of prefrontal reward representations, and aberrant reward processing, 
such as increased impulsivity, may be driven by deregulation of the DA system – 
potentially by deregulation of the D1-D2-system balance. This has important 
implications for how we characterize disorders related to aberrant reward 
processing and how we think about treatment for these disorders. In the end, we 
hope that neural and pharmacological investigations of hedonic and motivational 
reward dimensions will help both individuals dealing with compulsive or 
diminished reward seeking, as well as help the healthy align their motivations and 
pleasures so that rewards that are liked are sought out and those that are sought out 
are liked.  
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Abstract 
 
Rewards vary on multiple affective and motivational dimensions. Reward-encoding 
brain regions such as the ventral striatum (VS) are known to process these 
dimensions. However, the mechanism whereby reward dimensions are selected for 
neural processing and guiding behavior remains unclear. Therefore, we investigated 
how human individuals made either hedonic (liking) or motivational (wanting) 
evaluations of everyday items while undergoing functional imaging. We found that 
activity in the VS encoded both hedonic and motivational dimensions of reward. 
Critically, the VS preferentially processed the dimension currently being evaluated 
and showed judgment-specific functional connectivity with areas in the prefrontal 
cortex that encoded hedonic and motivational dimensions of reward, regardless of 
which judgment was currently relevant for behavior. These findings suggest a gating 
mechanism by which fronto-striatal pathways flexibly encode reward dimensions 
depending on their behavioral relevance. These findings have implications for 
impairments in behavioral flexibility observed in obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
addiction, and schizophrenia. 
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Introduction 
 
Reward is central for goal-directed behavior. However, reward is not a unitary 
concept but characterized by multiple dimensions. Activity in reward processing 
regions such as the ventral striatum (VS) correlates with various reward 
dimensions, including gains and losses (Delgado et al., 2000), pleasantness (Blood 
and Zatorre, 2001), hedonic value (Pecina and Berridge, 2005), motivational value 
(Kahnt and Tobler, 2013; Nunes et al., 2013), expected value (Knutson et al., 2005; 
Tobler et al., 2007), received value (Elliott et al., 2003), decision value (Lim et al., 
2011), and salience (Zink et al., 2004). Some of these different reward dimensions 
can be separated at the behavioral level (Kahneman et al., 1997; Berridge et al., 
2009). This raises an important yet unresolved question: does the VS process these 
dimensions simultaneously and in parallel, irrespective of which dimension is 
currently relevant for behavior? Alternatively, if instead of parallel processing only 
one dimension is processed at a time, how does the VS selectively and flexibly gate 
access to the behaviorally relevant signals? 
Here we focus on two particular reward dimensions, which overlap 
anatomically in the VS: the motivational drive to obtain rewards (wanting) and the 
hedonic pleasure associated with rewards (liking) (Castro and Berridge, 2014; 
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015; Pool et al., 2016). Given the overlap of wanting and 
liking within the VS (Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Berridge et al., 2009; Castro and 
Berridge, 2014) and the VS’s central position at the center of cortico-striatal loops 
(Haber, 2011), either mechanism could be implemented. The VS could participate in 
largely separate and parallel wanting and liking loops (Alexander et al., 1986; 
Cummings, 1993), passing on information received from distinct regions in medial 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, based on the anatomical 
convergence of prefrontal projections in the VS (Ferry et al., 2000; Haber et al., 
2006), the VS could dynamically interact with cortical wanting and liking regions 
depending on which dimension is currently required for guiding behavior. 
The present study probes whether the VS processes wanting and liking in 
parallel or flexibly encodes the dimension that is behaviorally relevant in a given 
moment. We designed a task in which participants indicated how much they wanted 
or liked various non-consumable rewards. If the VS processes both dimensions in 
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parallel, activity should scale with wanting or liking ratings irrespective of whether 
the current judgment is a wanting or a liking judgment. Conversely, if the VS gates 
signaling depending on the behaviorally relevant reward dimension, then VS activity 
should primarily encode the dimension that has to be judged in the current trial. In 
this case, activity in VS should reflect wanting ratings during wanting judgments and 
liking ratings during liking judgments. In agreement with the second hypothesis, we 
find evidence for striatal gating of hedonic and motivational reward dimensions. In 
contrast to the coding specificity observed in the VS, distinct regions of medial 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex encoded wanting or liking regardless of 
judgment type. Finally, fronto-striatal connectivity varied as a function of judgment 
type, supporting the idea that access to the currently relevant reward dimension is 
gated in the striatum. 
 
 
Results 
 
Wanting and liking can be dissociated behaviorally 
Participants rated everyday items in the scanner according to how much they 
wanted and how much they liked them (Figure 1A & B). The ratings in the scanner 
were collected twice – once before and once after participants played a game in 
which they won half of the items, which were handed over to them at the end of the 
game. The game allowed us to separate wanting and liking behaviorally, while also 
making the task more engaging. 
Participants differentiated between wanting and liking judgments regarding 
response times and ratings (Figure 1C-E). An ANOVA with repeated-measures 
factors Session (pre or post game), Judgment type (wanting or liking rating), and 
Stimulus type (won or lost item) revealed a main effect of Session on response times 
(F(1,27)=29.94, p<0.0001), as well as a main effect of Judgment type (F(1,27)=41.10, 
p<0.0001). Participants took significantly more time to make liking judgments than 
wanting judgments (t(27)=6.39, p<0.001; Figure 1E), suggesting that participants 
treated the two judgment types differently. Furthermore, wanting and liking ratings 
changed differentially from pre to post depending on whether the item was lost or 
won. Specifically, an ANOVA with repeated-measures factors Judgment type 
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(wanting or liking rating) and Stimulus type (won or lost item), revealed both main 
effects of Judgment type (F(1,27)=10.49, p<0.005) and Stimulus type (F(1,27)=21.40, 
p<0.0001), as well as an interaction between Stimulus and Judgment type on the 
change in ratings from pre to post game (F(1,27)=34.50, p<0.0001). Wanting 
decreased specifically for won items (change in wanting won vs. lost items: t(27)=-
5.28, p<.001; wanting won pre vs. won post: t(27)=4.81, p<0.001; wanting lost pre 
vs. lost post: t(27)=-0.16, p=0.873; Figure 1C). In contrast, liking decreased 
specifically for lost items (change in liking won vs. lost items: t(27)=2.79, p<0.05; 
liking won pre vs. won post: t(27)=0.52, p=0.609; liking lost pre vs. lost post: 
t(27)=4.50, p<0.001; Figure 1D). Taken together, these differences in response 
times and ratings provide evidence that the participants could differentially process 
the wanting and liking of items. 
 
Neural activity in the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex correlates with 
either wanting or liking 
We next assessed which neural systems encoded wanting and liking. Using a 
parametric general linear model (GLM), we identified regions where activations 
were parametrically associated either with wanting or with liking ratings (Table 1, 
Figure 2). In this GLM, we pooled data from both liking and wanting trials, resulting 
in one onset regressor, which was modulated by three parametric modulators 
(PMs): the individual average wanting rating of the presented item, the individual 
average liking rating of the presented item, and the trial-specific response time 
(serial orthogonalization of parametric regressors was turned off for these analyses 
(Mumford et al., 2015)). In a whole-brain (voxel-level) corrected analysis, we found 
that wanting was related to prefrontal activations, including medial parts of the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; z=5.03, family-wise error (FWE)-corrected, p<0.05, peak 
[0, 50, −5]; Figure 2A), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; z=5.21, FWE-
corrected, p<0.005, peak [−3, 44, −2]). In contrast, liking-related responses were 
more focal and limited to the central OFC (z=4.86, FWE-corrected, p<0.05, peak 
[−24, 47, −14]; Figure 2G) and posterior cingulate (z=4.92, FWE-corrected, p<0.05, 
peak [0, -34, 25]). These results suggest that neural activity in anatomically 
segregated regions of the PFC track either wanting or liking. 
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To further characterize the degree to which these responses are specific to 
wanting or liking, we employed a post-hoc regions-of-interest (ROI) analysis. We 
extracted both liking- and wanting-related responses in the clusters associated with 
wanting and liking ratings (Table 1) and assessed the difference between these 
responses. This allowed us to determine whether different regions encoded wanting 
and liking differently or similarly. While wanting- and liking-related responses in 
the posterior cingulate ROI did not differ significantly (t(27)=1.79, p=0.084), those 
extracted from the medial OFC and mPFC ROIs did. Responses in the central OFC 
showed significantly stronger associations with liking than wanting (t(27)=2.62, 
p=0.014). In contrast, the medial OFC cluster as well as the mPFC cluster showed 
significantly larger responses for wanting than liking (medial OFC: t(27)=-2.97, 
p=0.006; mPFC: t(27)=-3.91, p=0.001). Thus, wanting and liking appear to be 
processed in anatomically distinct regions in the PFC but overlap in the posterior 
cingulate. 
 
Neural Activity in common regions of the VS correlates with both wanting and 
liking 
Previous animal work has implicated the VS (nucleus accumbens) and the pallidum 
in encoding both wanting and liking (Pecina et al., 2006). Based on these findings, 
we examined the role of these two areas in more detail. We analyzed data in two a 
priori anatomically defined ROIs encompassing these two regions (Table 1, Figure 
2). In the VS, we found wanting-related activations (z=4.06, small volume correction 
(FWE-SVC), p<0.01, peak [-6, 11, −2]; Figure 2B), as well as more confined liking-
related activations (z=3.79, FWE-SVC, p<0.05, peak [-9, 14, −5]; Figure 2H). In the 
pallidum, activity was parametrically associated only with liking ratings (z=3.97, 
FWE-SVC, p<0.01, peak [-15, 5, −2]). Thus, in line with previous animal studies, we 
find the VS encoded both wanting and liking, whereas the pallidum seems to be 
involved primarily in processing liking. 
To more systematically assess the relation of these striatal and pallidal 
responses to wanting and liking, we extracted and compared both wanting- and 
liking-related responses from the clusters in the VS and pallidum (Table 1). In 
contrast to the PFC clusters but similar to the posterior cingulate cluster, 
comparable wanting- and liking-related responses were found in both the VS and 
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pallidum ROIs associated with liking (VS: t(27)=0.67, p=0.508; pallidum: t(27)=1.05, 
p=0.305), as well as the VS ROI associated with wanting (VS: t(27)=-1.18, p=0.249). 
In line with an overlap of both reward dimensions primarily in the VS, a formal 
conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005) revealed common wanting and liking 
areas in the VS (z=3.97, FWE-SVC, p<0.05, peak [-9, 11, −5]; Figure 3A), but not in 
the pallidum and the posterior cingulate. Thus, while prefrontal responses appear 
to be specific to either wanting or liking and exhibit a regional dissociation between 
the two, responses in the VS (and to a lesser degree in the pallidum and posterior 
cingulate) seem to commonly encode both reward dimensions. 
 
Striatum, but not PFC, encodes reward dimensions in a behaviorally-relevant 
manner 
The results reported above suggest that wanting and liking are encoded in 
overlapping regions in the striatum but in separate regions in the PFC. We next 
assessed whether encoding of these two dimensions in the VS depends on which 
dimension is currently relevant for behavior. We, therefore, tested whether the 
responses identified by the parametric GLM were independent of the type of 
judgment participants made in a given trial or whether the VS switched between 
coding wanting and liking as a function of judgment type. For this analysis, we used 
a second parametric GLM that was split by trial type, with two regressors 
corresponding to trials in which liking and wanting judgments were made, 
respectively. Each of these regressors was again parametrically modulated by the 
individual average wanting rating of the presented item, the individual average 
liking rating of the presented item, and the trial-specific response time (serial 
orthogonalization of parametric regressors was again turned off for these analyses 
(Mumford et al., 2015)). These analyses were performed in ROIs of 6mm spheres 
around the peak voxels from the first parametric GLM (Table 1). We extracted and 
compared wanting-related responses during wanting and liking trials as well as 
liking-related responses during wanting and liking trials. This allowed us to assess 
whether responses were specific to the currently performed judgment (e.g., for 
wanting, specificity would be reflected in significantly stronger wanting signals 
emitted by wanting-related regions from the first model during wanting judgments 
compared to liking judgments). 
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For both liking- and wanting-related responses, areas in the PFC and 
posterior cingulate encoded reward dimensions irrespective of judgment type. 
Specifically, we found that liking-related responses within the central OFC ROI were 
significant during both liking and wanting judgments (liking trials: t(27)=2.83, 
p=0.009; wanting trials: t(27)=2.15, p=0.041) and did not differ significantly 
between judgment types (liking vs. wanting trials: t(27)=0.45, p=0.655). Likewise, 
liking-related responses in the posterior cingulate were significant during both 
judgment types (liking trials: t(27)=4.41, p= 0.0001; wanting trials: t(27)=4.14, p= 
0.0003) and did not differ significantly (liking vs. wanting trials: t(27)=0.23, 
p=0.823). Moreover, wanting-related responses in the mPFC and medial OFC were 
significant during both wanting and liking trials and did not differ significantly 
between judgment types (mPFC: wanting trials: t(27)=4.83, p=0.00005; liking trials: 
t(27)=4.57, p=0.0001; wanting vs. liking trials: t(27)=0.12, p=0.903; medial OFC: 
wanting trials: t(27)=5.33, p=0.00001; liking trials: t(27)=4.15, p=0.0003; wanting 
vs. liking trials: t(27)=0.51, p=0.613). Thus, beyond exhibiting regional specificity 
for motivational versus hedonic reward dimensions, these anatomically segregated 
cortical regions also appear to consistently code wanting or liking, regardless of 
which judgment is currently being made. 
In contrast, responses in the VS strongly depended on the current judgment 
type. Liking-related responses in the VS were only significant during liking 
judgments (liking trials: t(27)=4.85, p=0.00005; wanting trials: t(27)=1.49, p=0.15) 
and significantly stronger during liking than wanting judgments (liking vs. wanting 
trials: t(27)=2.32, p=0.028). Similarly, wanting-related responses in the VS were 
only significant during wanting judgments (wanting trials: t(27)=3.61, p=0.001; 
liking trials: t(27)=1.27, p=0.216) and significantly stronger for wanting than liking 
judgments (wanting vs. liking trials: t(27)=2.80, p=0.009). Focusing on the 
activation pattern of the common overlapping voxels in the VS (Figure 3A) mirrored 
this finding. We compared wanting-related and liking-related signals in the VS 
cluster defined by the conjunction analysis using an ANOVA with repeated-
measures factors Judgment type (wanting or liking trial) and Parametric modulator 
type (wanting or liking). In line with selective processing of the currently relevant 
reward dimension, we found a significant interaction of both factors (F(1,27)=7.17, 
p=0.012; Figure 3B), with stronger wanting-related responses during wanting 
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judgments than liking judgments (t(27)=2.53, p=0.018), and stronger liking-related 
responses during liking than wanting judgments (t(27)=2.28, p=0.031). Taken 
together, while the frontal ROIs (OFC and mPFC) exhibit regional specificity for 
wanting and liking regardless of judgment type, the striatum flexibly encodes 
wanting or liking depending on whether wanting or liking judgments are required. 
 
Fronto-striatal pathways gate behaviorally relevant reward dimensions 
Lastly, we explored the mechanism by which activity in the VS could flexibly switch 
between the encoding of different reward dimensions. One possible mechanism 
could be to flexibly enhance the cross-talk between the VS and the cortical region 
processing the currently relevant dimension proportional to the current level of this 
reward dimension. To examine this possibility, we performed a psychophysiological 
interaction (PPI) analysis and tested whether functional coupling (fMRI signal 
coherence) between the VS and wanting and liking regions in the PFC depended on 
the type and level of the current judgment. We used the overlapping voxels in the VS 
as a seed region to extract the physiological signal. Psychological factors were liking 
and wanting judgment trials, each parametrically modulated by the average wanting 
and liking ratings of the current item. The parametric modulators were multiplied 
by the physiological variable to generate a total of 4 psychophysiological regressors 
(liking trial liking rating, liking trial wanting rating, wanting trial liking rating, 
wanting trial wanting rating). As target regions, we focused on the same ROIs in 
central OFC and mPFC defined above that processed wanting and liking ratings 
irrespective of the current judgment. During liking judgments, we found that VS 
connectivity with the central OFC was more strongly related to levels of liking than 
levels of wanting (z=3.26, FWE-SVC, p<0.05, peak [-21, 44, −11]; Figure 3 C). 
Conversely, during wanting judgments we found that VS connectivity with the mPFC 
was more strongly related to levels of wanting than levels of liking (z=3.10, FWE-
SVC, p<0.05, peak [-6, 44, 4]; Figure 3C). These results indicate that flexible 
processing of reward dimensions in the VS is realized by selectively gating input 
from regions of the PFC that encode the reward dimension that is currently relevant 
for behavior. Moreover, the degree of this connectivity modulation is directly related 
to the level of the currently relevant reward dimension. 
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Discussion 
 
A key contribution of our study is to clarify the role of the striatum in different 
dimensions of reward processing. We found that the striatum, in contrast to 
prefrontal regions, flexibly encodes reward dimensions depending on what is 
currently behaviorally relevant. This provides important insight into how reward 
information may be transformed in cortico-striatal circuits. The functional and 
anatomical nature of these circuits has been the focus of substantial amount of 
research. While earlier animal studies had suggested mainly a segregated, 
independent and parallel processing of information (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; 
Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985), recent models of how information is processed 
in the cortico-striatal loops have proposed a more integrative role for the striatum, 
where information from the cortex converges in the striatum and only behaviorally 
relevant information is passed on (Frank, 2011; Houk et al., 1995; Houk and Wise, 
1995; Percheron and Filion, 1991; Bar-Gad et al., 2003). Our results support the 
latter hypothesis, as we demonstrated that the VS preferred to encode the currently 
relevant reward dimension. 
 In contrast to the common coding of wanting and liking in the VS according 
to behavioral relevance, we find anatomical specificity in the cortical encoding of 
reward dimensions irrespective of behavioral relevance. Thus, the PFC appears to 
process the two reward dimensions studied here in a segregated and parallel 
manner. Specifically, we demonstrate that the motivational aspect of reward is 
processed by medial parts of the OFC, while the hedonic aspect is processed by the 
central/lateral OFC. A similar medial-lateral distinction has been observed in prior 
animal recording and human imaging studies, with medial frontal regions exhibiting 
a role in goal-directed calculations (Rushworth et al. 2013), and lateral frontal 
regions being more strongly involved in encoding emotion and affective values of 
specific outcomes (Kringelbach, 2005; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Murray, 2007; 
Rushworth et al., 2011; Howard et al., 2015; Howard and Kahnt, 2017). Our results 
extend this literature, by demonstrating that not only are areas of the PFC 
anatomically segregated in function but that they also process reward information 
in a parallel and consistent manner, irrespective of the current behavioral 
requirements. 
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Our findings are in line with the notion that information about distinct 
reward dimensions is segregated in the cortex, then converges onto the striatum and 
is expressed according to which type of value judgment is required. Thereby, our 
data inform current models of basal ganglia function and suggest how the basal 
ganglia can select appropriate actions while facing a considerable convergence of 
cortical information (Frank, 2011; Bar-Gad et al., 2003). Our data also suggest that 
flexible changes in VS encoding of reward dimensions are mediated by changes in 
the regionally corresponding allocation of fronto-striatal connectivity, with the 
strength of VS connectivity with specific regions in PFC being directly related to the 
level of the currently processed reward dimension. This is neurobiologically 
plausible, as the striatal spiny neurons receive input from numerous cortical 
neurons and can use pattern recognition to detect what is currently behaviorally 
relevant to the individual (Houk et al., 1995; Houk and Wise, 1995; Haber et al., 
2006; Lawrence et al., 1998). In fact, behaviorally specific striatal single unit activity 
has been demonstrated for motor programs (Mink, 1996). Mechanistically, the 
striatal spiny neurons could, therefore, fire to signal-relevant cortical value input, 
which could lead to a pause in firing in the pallidum and in turn produce specific 
activity for appropriate initiation of an action. Additionally, striatal dopamine may 
support the gating and control of cognitive representations from the PFC (Cools, 
2011). Together, whereas our data indicate that the striatum may play a key role in 
information selection by gating cortical inputs, the pharmacological underpinnings 
of the behaviorally-relevant encoding of reward dimensions require further 
investigation.  
Conceptually, flexible encoding of specific reward dimensions in the VS may 
more closely reflect the explicit decision of the individual than judgment-
independent segregated reward signals in the cortex. While this finding is in conflict 
with studies finding pre-decision valuation signals also in the striatum (Kable and 
Glimcher, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008), many studies do link the striatum with action 
selection (van der Meer and Redish, 2011). In fact, the VS is vital for motivating 
actions and behaviors (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Mogenson et al., 1980), and 
has been found to influence action selection, by being involved in the choice, 
execution and inhibition of decisions and behaviors (Berridge, 2007; Cardinal et al., 
2002; Nicola, 2007; Salamone et al., 2009). Our study used current behavioral 
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relevance as a tool to further investigate and separate signals in the PFC and VS. The 
results suggest that cortical valuation signals may act as inputs in the choice process, 
whereas striatal signals are more closely related to the outcome of the decision or 
action-appropriate value selection. 
Our findings of common wanting and liking signals in the VS are in line with 
numerous animal studies investigating hedonic and motivational reward 
dimensions (Tindell et al., 2005; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000; Pecina and Berridge, 
2005; Pecina et al., 2006; Smith and Berridge, 2007). Similarly, human neuroimaging 
studies using dietary restraint and satiation have found both wanting and liking 
signals in the VS (Born et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2015). In the light of these studies, 
our current finding of behavioral relevance-dependent expression of wanting in the 
VS suggests that behavioral relevance of wanting judgments for food rewards may 
be modulated by satiety and dietary restraint.  
Cortical reward signals have been linked to both hedonic and motivational 
dimensions of reward. In rats, Mena and colleagues (2011) found that local 
administration of a mu-opioid receptor agonist in the OFC and mPFC (corresponding 
to the infralimbic and prelimbic cortex) led to increased food intake. In humans, the 
OFC is often identified as an important reward and pleasure center, with medial and 
central parts of the OFC responding to pleasant tastes and smells (de Araujo et al., 
2003; Howard et al., 2015), to monetary (O'Doherty et al., 2001) and implicit and 
explicit social rewards (Tobler et al., 2016; Preller et al., 2014), as well as to pleasant 
musical chords (Blood et al., 1999). Particularly medial and more dorsal regions of 
OFC, extending into anterior cingulate and medial PFC have also been associated 
with processing decision value (La Vega et al., 2016; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012; 
Howard and Kahnt, 2017; Howard et al., 2015), which is directly related to how 
much a choice alternative is wanted (Rangel and Clithero, 2013; Montague and 
Berns, 2002). In line with this view, we and others find wanting signals in the medial 
OFC (Jiang et al., 2015), as well as vmPFC (Heinz et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2012; 
Smith et al., 2010). Notably, our findings indicate that choice is not necessary to 
reveal value-related responses in these regions, concurring with previous findings 
that the brain valuation system is engaged in valuation even when there are no 
economic choices (Gross et al., 2014; Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 2014; Tobler et al., 2008; Tusche et al., 2010). More importantly, we go beyond 
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previous findings by revealing that wanting-related parametric value levels activate 
the mPFC more than liking-related value levels and thereby specify the function of 
this core component of the valuation system. 
 Finally, dysfunctions in fronto-striatal loops are implicated in several 
neuropsychiatric disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, addiction, and 
schizophrenia. For example, addiction could be viewed as a wanting-dominated 
state (Berridge et al., 2009) where the behaviorally appropriate switching to liking 
no longer works. Our results suggest that this may be due to altered fronto-striatal 
coupling. More generally, our findings may have implications for these impairments 
and may ultimately help to develop novel treatment approaches.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We find anatomically segregated wanting and liking-related signals in the PFC, as 
well as common wanting and liking-related responses in the VS. Our results are 
consistent with the idea that hedonic and motivational reward dimensions from the 
cortex converge in the striatum and are passed on from the striatum in a condensed 
and focused manner. We suggest that this is mechanistically implemented through 
fronto-striatal gating of different reward signals. In the PFC, motivational and 
hedonic dimensions of reward are encoded in a parallel and anatomically separated 
manner, while the VS flexibly encodes only the reward dimension that is currently 
relevant for behavior. This allows the striatum to act as a detector for behaviorally 
relevant reward dimensions and enables selective processing of reward information 
required for guiding ongoing actions appropriately. Thus, our findings show how the 
VS reduces the multiplexed nature of reward information and enables adaptive 
action selection. More generally, we demonstrate that besides selecting actions that 
provide the highest (decision) value within a given situation, the brain can also 
contextually select value representations. Finally, our data suggest situation-
adapted modulation of connectivity as one possibility of achieving selection.      
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Materials and methods 
 
Participants 
We studied 28 right-handed participants, aged 20-29 years (22.8 ±0.5 years, mean 
±SEM; 14 females). All participants were recruited from the Laboratory for Social 
and Neural Systems Research participant pool and provided written informed 
consent. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Forty everyday items were used as rewards in the study. Items were selected based 
on prior pilot experiments, so that initial mean liking and wanting ratings were 
similar. Before scanning, participants viewed all items in real life, which ensured 
that they recognized and were familiar with each item. During the tasks, pictures of 
items were presented using Matlab (MathWorks Inc.) and the Cogent 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
 In the scanner, participants were asked to rate each item according to how 
much they wanted to have it, as well as how much they liked the item, at that 
moment. In each trial (Figure 1B), participants first saw a cue indicating the type of 
rating trial (1s), followed by an image of the item (3s), and finally the rating screen 
(3.5s). Ratings were provided on a continuous scale using a trackball. Trials were 
separated by a variable inter-trial-interval (mean 3s). Each item was rated twice for 
wanting and twice for liking, resulting in 160 trials split into 4 runs before the game 
and the same again after the game. 
 Participants performed the rating task in two sessions, which were separated 
by a game in which participants could win some of the items outside of the scanner 
(Figure 1A). The game consisted of a perceptual task, in which participants had to 
indicate whether the item was presented to the left or the right of the midpoint of 
the screen. Participants won items that they classified correctly. The difficulty of the 
game was calibrated so that participants won and lost 50% of the items. In order to 
make the items more salient and thereby enhance the memorability of winning and 
losing the items, participants were seated at a table with the items set up next to 
them, while they performed the task on a computer. Additionally, immediately after 
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the game, participants packed up the items they won in a bag, which they later took 
home. 
 
MRI Data Acquisition  
Whole-brain scanning was performed with a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body MRI 
scanner equipped with an 8-channel head coil. For each of the 8 scanning runs, 227 
T2*-weighted whole-brain EPI images were acquired in ascending order (33 
transverse (axial) slices per volume, Field of View 192x192x108 mm, slice thickness 
2.6 mm, 0.7 mm gap, in-plane resolution 2×2 mm, matrix 96*96, repetition time (TR) 
2000 ms, echo time (TE) 25 ms, flip angle 80°). Additionally, a T1-weighted turbo 
field echo structural image was acquired in sagittal orientation for each participant 
with the same angulation as applied to the functional scans (181 slices, Field of View 
256x256x181 mm, slice thickness 1 mm, no gap, in-plane resolution 1*1 mm, matrix 
256*256, repetition time 8.4 ms, echo time 3.89 ms, flip angle 8°). 
 
MRI Preprocessing  
Preprocessing and statistical analysis of the MRI data was performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
London, UK). All EPI images were temporally corrected to the middle slice, realigned 
to the mean image, normalized (resampling to 3×3×3 mm voxels) to the standard 
EPI template of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) and smoothed using a 
Gaussian Kernel with 4 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM). We chose a 
relatively small smoothing kernel, as we were particularly interested in the VS and 
a recent meta-analysis found that in order to avoid bias against subcortical 
activations, applying minimal smoothing is recommended (Sacchet and Knutson, 
2013). 
 
MRI Data Analysis 
To detect activity related to wanting or liking, we used a parametric analysis. The 
first GLM pooled data from wanting and liking judgments into one judgment-type-
unspecific regressor, time-locked to the onset of each trial. This regressor was 
modulated by 3 parametric modulators (PMs): within-session normalized average 
wanting ratings, within-session normalized average liking ratings, and response 
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times. Importantly, to ensure that all regressors explain only independent 
components of variance, serial orthogonalization of parametric regressors (as 
implemented in SPM) was turned off (Mumford et al., 2015). Moreover, the GLM 
contained the 6 nuisance movement parameters. The duration of the onset 
regressor was 7s, which corresponds to the time participants had to view and rate 
each image (Figure 1B). We report whole-brain results (p<0.05, voxel-level family-
wise error (FWE) corrected) as well as activations in the a priori ROIs ventral 
striatum and pallidum (p<0.05, voxel-level FWE corrected). The ROI for the VS was 
based on earlier studies and included the nucleus accumbens, ventral caudate 
nucleus, and putamen rostral to the anterior commissure (Murray et al., 2008). The 
ROI for the pallidum was derived from the automatic anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas 
incorporated in the WFU-PickAtlas Tool in SPM (Maldjian et al., 2003; Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002). 
In order to determine whether responses were specific or common to 
wanting and liking we used an ROI analysis. To check for specificity, we extracted 
parameter estimates for each of the wanting and liking clusters identified by the 
parametric contrast (table 1) and used paired t-tests to determine whether 
parameter estimates of one PM were significantly higher than the other PM. To 
determine common areas of wanting and liking we used an inclusive masking 
procedure, which identifies areas significantly associated with both wanting and 
liking PMs (Nichols et al., 2005). 
We used a second GLM to investigate judgment-specific and judgment-
unspecific activations. In this model we separated wanting and liking trials, so that 
there were two onset regressors corresponding to judgment type (wanting trial or 
liking trial), which each had 3 parametric modulators associated with it (within-
session normalized average wanting ratings of the presented item, within-session 
normalized average liking ratings of the presented item, and trial-specific response 
times), as well as the 6 nuisance movement parameters. Again, serial 
orthogonalization of parametric regressors was turned off. We then used an ROI 
analysis to investigate whether responses to wanting and liking identified by the 
first GLM depended on judgment type. ROIs were 6mm spheres around the peak of 
the activations identified by the first GLM. We used Marsbar (Brett et al., 2002; 
http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) to extract parameter estimates for each of the 
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PMs split by judgment type, which were then tested using repeated-measures 
ANOVAs and paired t-tests. 
 
Connectivity Analysis 
We performed a PPI analysis (Friston et al., 1997) with the VS (showing common 
coding of wanting and liking) as the seed region and Judgment type (wanting vs 
liking) and Level (parametric regressors for wanting vs liking ratings) as 
psychological factors. We used the generalized form of the PPI model (McLaren et 
al., 2012) to test whether the strength of the functional connectivity between the VS 
and the cortical regions showing specific coding of either wanting or liking 
depended on the type and level of the judgment performed on a given trial. The seed 
region was defined by the overlap of the wanting and liking-related activations 
(Figure 3A). For each subject, we estimated a PPI model with the activity in the seed 
region included as the physiological regressor and Judgment type (wanting trial or 
liking trial), modulated by the within-session normalized average wanting ratings, 
as well as the within-session normalized mean liking ratings included as the 
psychological regressors. The four parametric modulators were multiplied with the 
physiological variable to create the psychophysiological regressors of interest 
(liking trial liking rating, liking trial wanting rating, wanting trial liking rating, 
wanting trial wanting rating). The two critical comparisons of the PPI regressors 
were: wanting rating vs liking rating during wanting trials and liking rating vs 
wanting rating during liking trials. We focused our analysis on the prefrontal 
clusters in the mPFC and OFC that were identified by the first GLM. 
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1. Task and behavior. A. Timeline of the experimental design. Wanting and 
liking ratings were collected in the scanner. After the initial session (pre), 
participants were removed from the scanner and completed a game on a computer 
in an adjacent room. Participants were then asked to rate the items in a second 
session (post) in the scanner. B. Timing of the scanned task. Wanting and liking 
judgments, as well as the location of the anchor points of the rating scale, were 
randomized across trials. C. Change in wanting ratings as a function of game 
outcomes. Wanting decreased from pre to post game specifically for won items but 
remained similar for lost items (wanting won pre vs. won post: t(27)=4.81, p<0.001; 
wanting lost pre vs. lost post: t(27)=-0.16, p=0.873). D. Change in liking ratings as a 
function of game outcomes. Liking decreased from pre to post game specifically for 
lost items but remained similar for won items (liking won pre vs. won post: 
t(27)=0.52, p=0.609; liking lost pre vs. lost post: t(27)=4.50, p<0.001). E. Response 
times for the ratings. Participants became significantly faster from pre to post game 
and took significantly longer to make liking judgments compared to wanting 
judgments. ***p<.001; error bars depict SEM.  
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Figure 2. Neural correlates of Wanting and Liking. A-D: Wanting ratings 
correlated with activity in the mPFC (A & C) and VS (B & D). E-F: Contrast estimates 
for the wanting parametric modulators during liking and wanting trials. G-J: Liking 
ratings correlated with activity in the OFC (G & I) and VS (H & J). K-L: Contrast 
estimates for the liking parametric modulators during liking and wanting trials. 
*p<.05; error bars depict SEM. 
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Figure 3. Gating of behaviorally relevant reward dimensions by fronto-striatal 
connectivity. A-B: Behaviorally relevant coding of wanting or liking levels in the VS. 
Conjunction of the parametric modulators for wanting and liking (A). Activity in the 
VS encoded wanting ratings during wanting trials and liking ratings during liking 
trials (B). C. Functional connectivity between VS and prefrontal activations related 
to wanting and liking depended on whether participants were making wanting or 
liking judgments. *p<.05; error bars depict SEM. 
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Table 1. Brain regions associated with liking or wanting irrespective of judgment 
type. 
    
MNI 
Coordinate       
  Region x y z       T k voxels 
Liking OFC -24 47 -14    6.23* 11 
 
Posterior 
cingulate 0 -34 25    6.34* 250 
 VS -9 14 -5    4.41 6 
 Pallidum -15 5 -2    4.69 2 
Wanting Medial OFC 0 50 -5    6.56* 180 
 mPFC -3 44 -2    6.93* 356 
 left VS -6 11 -2    4.83 22 
 right VS 6 11 4    4.63 7 
    12 14 -11    4.27 3 
Results surviving voxel-wise FWE-correction for multiple comparisons, * indicates 
p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain, all other regions 
significant after small volume correction, cluster size k based on p<0.001 
uncorrected threshold. MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; OFC, orbitofrontal 
cortex; VS, Ventral Striatum; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex. 
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Abstract 
 
The prefrontal cortex houses representations critical for ongoing and future 
behavior expressed in the form of patterns of neural activity. Dopamine has long 
been suggested to play a key role in the integrity of such representations, with D2-
receptor activation rendering them flexible but weak. However, it is currently 
unknown whether and how D2-receptor activation affects prefrontal 
representations in humans. In the current study, we use dopamine receptor-specific 
pharmacology and multivoxel pattern-based functional magnetic resonance 
imaging to test the hypothesis that blocking D2-receptor activation enhances 
prefrontal representations. Human subjects performed a simple reward prediction 
task after double-blind and placebo controlled administration of the D2-receptor 
antagonist amisulpride. Using a whole-brain searchlight decoding approach we 
show that D2-receptor blockade enhances decoding of reward signals in the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex. Examination of activity patterns suggests that amisulpride 
increases the separation of activity patterns related to reward versus no reward. 
Moreover, consistent with the cortical distribution of D2 receptors, post 
hoc analyses showed enhanced decoding of motor signals in motor cortex, but not 
of visual signals in visual cortex. These results suggest that D2-receptor blockade 
enhances content-specific representations in frontal cortex, presumably by a 
dopamine-mediated increase in pattern separation. These findings are in line with a 
dual-state model of prefrontal dopamine, and provide new insights into the 
potential mechanism of action of dopaminergic drugs.
 88 
Introduction 
 
The prefrontal cortex is critical for higher cognitive functions and goal-directed 
behavior (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Fuster, 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Specifically, 
sustained activity of neuronal populations in the prefrontal cortex of animals 
represents and maintains information for subsequent utilization (Goldman-Rakic, 
1996). The fidelity of these representations has been suggested to be modulated by 
dopamine in a receptor-specific manner (Durstewitz et al., 2000). More specifically, 
a physiologically plausible dual-state model suggests that D2-receptor activation 
renders prefrontal representations prone to interference and disruption by 
allowing for several simultaneous but weak network representations (Durstewitz et 
al., 2000; Seamans et al., 2001). Accordingly, blockade of D2-receptor activation 
should, in turn, enhance prefrontal representations by inhibiting potentially 
interfering concurrent representations (Seamans and Yang, 2004). However, the 
effects of dopamine D2-receptor blockade on cognitive representations in the 
human prefrontal cortex have remained elusive. 
Here we use dopamine receptor-specific pharmacology and multivoxel 
pattern-based fMRI to test the hypothesis that D2-receptor blockade enhances 
prefrontal reward signals in humans. Reward representations are fundamental for 
goal-directed behavior, learning, and decision-making. A prefrontal area key for 
representing reward-related information is the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Murray et 
al., 2007; Wallis, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011), and neurons in this region have been 
shown to maintain reward information throughout delays (Tremblay and Schultz, 
1999; Murray et al., 2007; Lara et al., 2009). Despite anatomical and 
cytoarchitectural differences in the OFC of different species (Wallis, 2012), neural 
signatures of reward value have been identified in the OFC of rodents (Schoenbaum 
et al., 1998; van Duuren et al., 2008; Takahashi et al., 2009), nonhuman primates 
(Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Morrison and 
Salzman, 2009; Kennerley et al., 2011), and humans (Gottfried et al., 2003; Lebreton 
et al., 2009; Kahnt et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012; Barron et 
al., 2013; McNamee et al., 2013). Reward signals can be decoded from fMRI activity 
in the OFC using multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) techniques (Kahnt et al., 2010; 
Vickery et al., 2011; McNamee et al., 2013; Kahnt et al., 2014). Instead of focusing on 
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single fMRI voxels, MVPA techniques combine the activity of multiple voxels and are 
thus capable of identifying signals that are encoded in the distributed activity of 
neuronal populations (Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kamitani and 
Tong, 2005). Here we use this technique to estimate a proxy of the fidelity of 
prefrontal reward representations. Specifically, we reasoned that enhanced 
prefrontal representations should be accompanied by increased fMRI pattern 
separation between reward and no reward, and thus lead to increased decoding 
accuracy. Using this MVPA measure, we examine the effects of dopamine D2-
receptor blockade on the decoding of reward signals in the human OFC. In particular, 
we hypothesize that blocking D2-receptor activation using the D2/D3-receptor 
antagonist amisulpride (Rosenzweig et al., 2002) enhances decoding of reward. 
 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Subjects 
In total, 53 right-handed, male subjects participated in the study. Two subjects (both 
in the placebo group) failed to follow the instructions and were excluded. This left 
51 subjects, aged 18–27 years (22.4 ± 0.28 years mean ± SEM). Before the 
experiment (1 h 30 min ± 4 min), subjects received a pill containing either placebo 
(N = 24) or 400 mg of the D2-receptor antagonist amisulpride (N = 27) in a 
randomized and double-blind fashion. To enhance and equate absorption time 
across subjects, subjects were asked to fast for 6 h before the experiment. Groups 
did not differ in age (t = 0.83, p = 0.41) or weight (t = 0.36, p = 0.72), and subjects 
were unaware of whether or not they received the drug, as assessed by 
postexperimental questionnaires (χ2 = 0.10, p = 0.75). 
 
Task and Stimuli 
To investigate neural reward signals we used a noninstrumental outcome prediction 
task (Kahnt et al., 2014) in which different visual stimuli were deterministically 
associated either with reward (CHF 0.20) or with no reward (CHF 0.00). In each trial 
(Fig. 1A), subjects saw one of four visual cues for 0.6 s, followed by a response 
mapping screen on which they had to indicate the upcoming reward (+, reward; −, 
 90 
no reward, x, unsure) using the index, middle, or ring finger of their right hand. To 
control for preparatory and motor-related signals, associations between buttons 
and responses were randomized across trials (i.e., in different trials, different 
buttons had to be pressed to indicate +, −, and x). The response mapping screen 
stayed on for a total of 1.5 s and was followed by the presentation of the outcome       
(1 s). Trials were separated by a variable intertrial interval (1.9 − 9.9 s, mean 3.5 s). 
To control for the visual features of the cues and the outcomes, two different sets of 
cue-outcome pairs were used. With one pair, the outcomes were shown as images 
of coins and with the other pair as digits (Fig. 1B). This ensured that the decoded 
signals were related to reward rather than visual features of cues or outcomes (see 
below, MVPA searchlight decoding). Outcomes were deterministically (100% cue-
outcome contingency) predicted by the cues (associations were randomized across 
subjects), and each cue-outcome pair was presented 10 times in each of the five 
scanning runs. Before fMRI data acquisition, subjects performed one training 
session to learn the cue-outcome associations (Fig. 1C). 
 
fMRI Acquisition and Preprocessing  
Functional imaging was performed on a Philips Achieva 3 T whole-body scanner 
equipped with an 8-channel head coil. During each of the five scanning sessions, 140 
T2*-weighted whole-brain EPI images (37 transversal slices acquired in ascending 
order) were acquired with a TR of 2 s. Imaging parameters were as follows: slice 
thickness, 3 mm; in-plane resolution, 2.75 × 2.75 mm; TE, 30 ms; flip angle, 90°. 
Preprocessing was performed using SPM8 and consisted of slice-time correction, 
realignment, and spatial normalization to the standard EPI template of the MNI, 
resampling to 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxels. Unsmoothed time series data were used for the 
MVPA analysis, whereas data for the standard univariate GLM analysis were 
smoothed using a Gaussian Kernel with 8 mm FWHM. 
 
MVPA Searchlight Decoding  
To decode reward representations (reward vs no reward) we used linear support 
vector classification (SVC) in combination with a searchlight approach that allows 
whole-brain information mapping without potentially biasing voxel selection 
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2007). At the level of single OFC neurons, 
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reward information is represented either positively (more activation for higher 
value) or negatively (more activation for lower value; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; 
Morrison and Salzman, 2009; Kennerley et al., 2011). The two populations are 
intercalated in the OFC (Morrison and Salzman, 2009), making it difficult to identify 
these signals using conventional univariate fMRI analyses (Kennerley et al., 2009). 
However, individual voxels can happen to cover a slightly higher proportion of one 
or the other population (i.e., sampling bias), which results in a nonzero response of 
each voxel (Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kamitani and Tong, 2005). The response biases 
of a set of voxels form a condition-specific multivoxel response pattern, such that 
the pattern elicited by the reward condition is different from that elicited by the no 
reward condition. These different patterns can then be classified as belonging to 
reward or no reward trials using pattern recognition algorithms (Kahnt et al., 2010, 
2011b). However, it should be noted that it is not entirely clear how exactly 
multivoxel patterns translate to the underlying neurophysiology, and several 
models accounting for the relationship between multivoxel patterns and neural 
firing have been proposed. Specifically, in addition to the biased sampling model 
described above, activity patterns have been suggested to reflect complex 
spatiotemporal dynamics of the vascular system (Kriegeskorte et al., 2010; Shmuel 
et al., 2010) and large-scale biases (Mannion et al., 2010; Freeman et al., 2011). 
Regardless of the exact mechanism, MVPA methods have been widely used to 
decode signals represented differentially in intercalated neural populations (Haxby 
et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kamitani and Tong, 2005; Xue et al., 2010; Kahnt 
et al., 2011a), and are able to disentangle overlapping representations within single 
brain regions, such as value and salience in parietal cortex (Kahnt et al., 2014) or 
color and motion direction in early visual cortex (Seymour et al., 2009). 
In a first step, we estimated condition-specific response amplitudes for each 
voxel and scanning run that were later used as input to the SVC. Specifically, for each 
fMRI scanning run, we estimated a voxelwise GLM. This GLM contained four 
regressors for the onsets of the four cue-outcome pairs (duration 3.1 s) that were 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function, as well as six 
regressors of no interest, which accounted for variance induced by head motion. The 
voxelwise parameter estimates for the four regressors of interest represent the 
response amplitudes to each of the four cue-outcome pairs in each of the five 
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scanning runs. They were subsequently used as input to a subject-wise SVC decoding 
analysis described below. 
The SVC was performed by using the LIBSVM implementation 
(http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/∼cjlin/libsvm/) with a linear kernel and a cost 
parameter of c = 0.1 [using different cost parameters or a different decoding 
algorithm (Naive Bayes Classifier) produced similar results]. At each voxel, we 
formed a searchlight in the form of a sphere with a radius of 10 mm surrounding the 
center voxel. Thus, each searchlight contained ∼170 voxels (different searchlight 
sizes produced similar results). The activity patterns within each searchlight were 
used to decode information about reward by using the following cross-validation 
procedure. We trained an SVC model to classify patterns of parameter estimates for 
reward versus no reward trials from stimulus set I and obtained the cross-validated 
decoding accuracy by testing the SVC model on parameter estimates for reward 
versus no reward trials from stimulus set II (Fig. 2A). This procedure was repeated 
vice versa by training on stimulus set II and testing on stimulus set I. The decoding 
accuracies for both directions were averaged to obtain a measure of locally 
distributed reward information that was assigned to the center voxel of the 
searchlight. This procedure was repeated for every possible center voxel (i.e., 
searchlight) and resulted in a subject-wise, whole-brain 3D map of decoding 
accuracy. Importantly, by training and testing the classifier on data from different 
stimulus sets, we ensured that decoding accuracy is only related to what is common 
between the two cue-outcome pairs of each set (i.e., reward information) and not 
related to the visual features of the cues paired with reward and no reward. 
Moreover, because decoding accuracy was computed based on model predictions in 
independent test data, and not based on model fits in the training data, this cross-
validation procedure is completely insensitive to potential noise fitting (i.e., 
overfitting) in the training data (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). 
 
Group Level Analysis 
To identify brain regions where decoding accuracy differed between the two groups, 
the subject-wise decoding accuracy maps were smoothed with a Gaussian Kernel of 
6 mm FWHM and entered into voxelwise two-sample t-tests. This generated a 
voxelwise whole-brain t-map reflecting the statistical significance of the group 
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differences in decoding accuracy. Except for exploratory analyses, we corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster-level by applying a whole-brain FWE-corrected 
threshold of pFWE-corr < 0.05. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
To test for changes in the reward-related fMRI signal between groups, we performed 
a conventional univariate analysis. This analysis was performed on the smoothed 
time series data. The GLM contained the same regressors (four regressors for the 
four cue-outcome pairings) and the six movement parameters. Subject-wise linear 
contrast images were computed for reward minus no reward and entered into 
voxelwise two-sample t-tests for group analysis. 
 
 
Results 
 
Behavior 
One and a half hours before the experiment, subjects received a pill containing either 
placebo (N = 24) or 400 mg of the D2-receptor blocker amisulpride (N = 27) in a 
randomized parallel double-blind design. Previous studies have shown that a single 
dose of 400 mg of sulpiride (similar to amisulpride) occupies ∼30% of D2 receptors 
in the striatum (Mehta et al., 2008). To reveal reward representations, subjects 
performed a noninstrumental outcome prediction task (see Materials and Methods) 
in which visual cues deterministically (100% cue-outcome contingency) predicted 
reward or no reward. In each trial, subjects saw one cue and were asked to indicate 
the upcoming outcome on a randomized response mapping screen before the actual 
outcome was shown (Fig. 1A). Two different pairs of cues predicted reward or no 
reward either in the form of coins or numbers (Fig. 1B). To make a correct response 
on a given trial, subjects had to represent the predicted reward and act on this 
representation. 
Subjects in both groups learned the associations between all visual cues and 
outcomes before the first scanning run and maintained high performance 
throughout scanning (Fig. 1C). In line with the notion that amisulpride induces very 
little behavioral effects (Rosenzweig et al., 2002), groups did not differ in any 
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behavioral learning or performance parameters. Specifically, a time by group 
ANOVA on the percentage of correct responses revealed a significant effect of time 
(F(59,2891) = 23.30, p < 0.001), but no effect of group (amisulpride vs placebo, 
F(1,49) = 1.42, p = 0.24), and no group by time interaction (F(59,2891) = 0.93, p = 
0.62). To capture potential differences in learning speed between groups, we 
estimated the learning rate (α) of a simple reinforcement learning (RL) model 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Kahnt et al., 2009). Mirroring task performance, the 
individual learning rates did not differ between groups (amisulpride, α = 0.56, ±0.07; 
placebo, α = 0.64, ±0.06; t = −0.86, p = 0.39). Testing for reward-specific effects, a 
group (amisulpride vs placebo) by reward (reward vs no reward) ANOVA on the 
percentage of correct responses (Fig. 1D) did not reveal a significant main effect of 
group (F(1,49) = 1.375, p = 0.25), reward (F(1,49) = 0.238, p = 0.63), or a group by 
reward interaction (F(1,49) = 0.001, p = 0.98). A corresponding ANOVA on response 
times (RTs) revealed a significant effect of reward (F(1,49) = 128.10, p < 0.001; 
faster responding in reward than no reward trials) but no significant effect of group 
(F(1,49) = 0.27, p = 0.61), and no group by reward interaction (F(1,49) = 0.27, p = 
0.61). In summary, these results demonstrate that groups were well matched with 
regard to behavioral performance, and that neural reward signals can, therefore, be 
compared between groups independent of potentially confounding differences in 
behavior or learning. 
 
Prefrontal reward signals 
We revealed neural reward signals by applying multivoxel pattern-based 
decoding techniques. Specifically, using a searchlight-decoding approach 
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2007) and linear SVC we searched for 
information about reward value that is contained in locally distributed multivoxel 
patterns of fMRI activity (see Materials and Methods). To avoid confounds related 
to the specific (e.g., visual) features of the cues and to ensure that classifier 
performance is only driven by reward information, we used a cross-classification 
procedure. Specifically, we trained the SVC model on the multivoxel response 
patterns acquired during the presentation of one set of cue-outcome pairs (reward 
vs no reward), and tested it on the multivoxel response patterns evoked by the other 
set of cue-outcome pairs (Fig. 2A). 
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We hypothesized that D2-receptor blockade should reduce the D2-mediated 
weakening of prefrontal representations (Seamans and Yang, 2004) and thus 
enhance fMRI pattern separation between reward and no reward trials, which in 
turn should increase decoding accuracy in the amisulpride group. In line with this 
prediction, we found significantly (pFWE-corr < 0.05) higher decoding accuracies in the 
medial OFC (MNI coordinates [x, y, z], [−3, 35, −23], t = 6.07, pFWE-corr = 0.012) in the 
amisulpride than the placebo group (Fig. 2B, see Table 1 for results at an 
uncorrected threshold). A similar effect in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex did 
not survive correction for multiple comparisons (left middle and superior frontal 
gyrus, [−27, 14, 55], t = 4.04, pFWE-corr = 0.058). Exploratory analyses revealed no 
significant (puncorr < 0.001) voxels when searching for higher decoding accuracy in 
the placebo than amisulpride group. The same set of results was obtained when 
behavioral performance was included as covariate of no interest, demonstrating 
that (nonsignificant) behavioral differences did not affect our decoding results. 
The decoding results described above provide only an abstract picture of the 
changes induced by amisulpride. We further examined the pattern changes in the 
OFC using more direct and parsimonious methods. Specifically, we tested whether 
amisulpride enhances pattern separation between reward and no reward trials in 
the OFC, by computing the mean squared difference between the activity patterns 
related to reward and no reward trials. Comparing this measure between the two 
groups demonstrated significantly greater pattern separation in the amisulpride 
compared with the placebo group (t = 2.29, p = 0.01, one-tailed; Fig. 3). Notably, 
these changes in pattern separation were not accompanied by changes in the 
variance of the patterns per se (t = 0.55, p = 0.58). Moreover, we tested whether 
patterns in the amisulpride group were also more consistent across time by 
correlating the reward coding patterns from different scanning runs. As expected, 
this revealed significantly higher temporal pattern consistency in the amisulpride 
versus the placebo group (t = 1.90, p = 0.03, one-tailed). 
We confirmed the results of the searchlight analysis using an independent 
region of interest analysis in anatomically defined subregions of the OFC (medial, 
central, and lateral OFC; Fig. 4A). Training and testing the SVC on the activity 
patterns within these anatomical regions (using the cross-classification procedure 
described above) revealed enhanced reward representation with D2-receptor 
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blockade in the medial OFC (t = 2.67, p = 0.01, one-tailed) but not the central (t = 
1.55, p = 0.13) and lateral OFC (t = 1.50, p = 0.14, Fig. 4B). Moreover, pattern 
separation and pattern consistency over time were significantly enhanced in the 
amisulpride relative to the placebo group in the anatomically defined medial OFC 
(pattern separation, t = 2.17, p = 0.02; pattern consistency t = 2.69, p = 0.005, one-
tailed), but not in the central OFC (pattern separation, t = 1.24, p = 0.11; pattern 
consistency, t = 1.31, p = 0.10, one-tailed) or the lateral OFC (pattern separation, t = 
1.21, p = 0.11; pattern consistency, t = 1.34, p = 0.09, one-tailed). 
To examine the effects of amisulpride on mean BOLD signals, we performed 
a standard univariate analysis (see Materials and Methods). Univariate BOLD signals 
in the medial OFC did not differ between groups (t = −0.83, p = 0.41). However, an 
exploratory voxelwise whole-brain analysis revealed elevated activation in reward 
> no-reward trials in the amisulpride group compared with the placebo group in the 
ventral striatum ([15, 14, −11], t = 3.05, puncorr < 0.005). Together, these findings 
suggest that whereas amisulpride may enhance the average reward signal in the 
ventral striatum, the effects on prefrontal representations are more subtle. 
Specifically, amisulpride in the prefrontal cortex enhances the decoding of reward 
information by increasing pattern separation between the reward and no reward 
trials as well as pattern consistency across time, without changing the mean signal 
between conditions. 
 
Other cortical signals 
An important question is whether the enhancement of decodability by D2-receptor 
blockade is specific for reward signals. In principle, amisulpride could generally 
increase decoding of content-specific signals in cortical areas with substantial D2-
receptor density. In a set of post hoc analyses, we, therefore, tested whether 
amisulpride also enhances decoding of other signals required for task performance. 
For instance, subjects gave their behavioral response using the index, middle, or ring 
finger (randomized across trials) of their right hand, which should elicit 
characteristic activity patterns in premotor and motor cortex of the contralateral 
hemisphere. Given the presence of D2 receptors in motor cortex (Lidow et al., 1989), 
amisulpride should enhance decoding of these signals. To test this idea, we decoded 
the specific motor response that subjects made on a given trial using a leave-one-
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run-out cross-validation procedure. Specifically, using a searchlight approach we 
trained and tested a three-class SVC on activity patterns corresponding to the three 
fingers that were used to make the response. We found significantly higher decoding 
accuracy in left premotor (BA 6) and primary motor cortex (BA 4, [−51, −10, 43], t = 
3.61, puncorr < 0.001) in the amisulpride relative to the placebo group (Fig. 5). This 
suggests that amisulpride enhanced the separation of finger-specific fMRI response 
patterns in areas of motor cortex that represent the fingers of the right hand (Meier 
et al., 2008). 
 In contrast, signals in regions with few D2 receptors, such as visual cue 
representations in occipital cortex (Lidow et al., 1989), should not be changed by 
amisulpride. As a control, we used a searchlight approach to decode visual signals 
independent of value (leave-one-run-out training and testing on the left-out run for 
reward and no reward set I versus reward and no reward set II). In line with the idea 
that the effects of amisulpride on cortical representations are specific to regions 
with a high density of D2 receptors, we did not find any significant (puncorr > 0.01) 
increases (amisulpride > placebo) in the accuracy for visual decoding in early visual 
areas. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In the current study, we examined the relationship between dopamine D2 signaling 
and prefrontal representations in humans. Dopamine has long been suggested to 
play a fundamental role in prefrontal functions (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Robbins 
and Arnsten, 2009; D'Ardenne et al., 2012). For instance, dopamine applied to the 
primate prefrontal cortex enhances the signal-to-noise ratio of pyramidal neurons 
representing task-relevant stimuli (Jacob et al., 2013). However, effects of dopamine 
on prefrontal function seem to be receptor specific, as D1- and D2-specific agents 
differentially affect the activity patterns of prefrontal neurons (Seamans et al., 
2001). For instance, a low dose of a D1 agonist applied to the prefrontal cortex 
sharpens the spatial tuning of task-sensitive neurons in a spatial working memory 
task (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007), and blocking prefrontal D1 receptors impairs 
learning of visuomotor associations (Puig and Miller, 2012). In contrast, D2-receptor 
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antagonists impair cognitive flexibility without altering behavioral performance 
(Puig and Miller, 2014), or even fail to affect neuronal activity in the prefrontal 
cortex at all (Sawaguchi et al., 1990). By showing that D2-receptor blockade 
enhances decoding of reward signals in the human OFC, our study provides evidence 
for the importance of receptor-specific dopamine action on prefrontal 
representations in humans. 
We found enhanced decoding not only for reward signals in the OFC but also 
for motor signals in the motor cortex. In contrast, visual signals in occipital areas 
remained unaltered by amisulpride. Intriguingly, D2-receptor concentration in the 
primate brain follows an anterior–posterior gradient with the highest concentration 
in the prefrontal cortex and the lowest concentration in the occipital cortex, with 
motor cortex falling in between (Lidow et al., 1989). Our results, therefore, suggest 
that amisulpride enhances decoding of region-specific information in cortical 
regions with high D2-receptor density, presumably by enhancing the separation of 
content-specific response patterns. However, further studies are required to explore 
the range of signals for which decoding is enhanced by amisulpride. 
These results are in line with a dual-state model of prefrontal dopamine, 
which suggests that activation of D2 and D1 receptors has opposing effects on the 
strength of network representations (Durstewitz et al., 2000; Seamans et al., 2001). 
According to the model, when D1 activation predominates (D1-dominated state), 
only very strong inputs are able to access prefrontal circuits and establish dominant 
network representations therein. This effect of D1-receptor activation is thought to 
be mediated by persistent NMDA receptor activation and increased GABAergic 
inhibition. In contrast, predominant D2 activation (D2-dominated state) is 
accompanied by reduced GABAergic inhibition allowing multiple inputs to 
simultaneously establish weak and fragile network representations in the prefrontal 
cortex. Our results provide support for this model in humans by showing that D2-
receptor blockade is sufficient to enhance decoding of prefrontal signals. 
Specifically, by blocking D2 receptors, amisulpride should have decreased the 
likelihood of D2-dominated states and increased the likelihood of D1-dominated 
states (Seamans and Yang, 2004). Hypothetically, this could have strengthened 
prefrontal representations, which in turn resulted in enhanced fMRI pattern 
separation and thus improved decoding accuracy. While recent findings call for 
 99 
modifications of this model (Tseng and O'Donnell, 2007), and the proposed 
mechanism and functional consequences are therefore presently somewhat 
speculative, the model predicts that D1-receptor antagonists should weaken 
prefrontal representations relative to placebo. Unfortunately, such agents are 
currently unavailable for use in humans. It is important to note that this model was 
originally designed to account for sustained activity in prefrontal cortex, 
maintaining sensory or mnemonic representations. Nevertheless, similar 
mechanisms could apply to activity patterns in motor and premotor cortex, 
maintaining motor representations. 
The model described above focuses on how D2-blockade affects prefrontal 
representations through local effects on D2 receptors (which are located mainly in 
layer 5), and the regional specificity of our effects is explained most parsimoniously 
with this local mechanism. However, more indirect routes and mechanisms may 
fulfill similar functions. For instance, two opposing pathways project from the 
striatum through the thalamus back to the cortex (Frank et al., 2004). Activity in the 
direct pathway is thought to facilitate prefrontal representations, whereas activity 
in the indirect pathway suppresses representations. Interestingly, neurons in the 
direct and indirect pathway primarily express D1 and D2 receptors, respectively 
(Aubert et al., 2000). Reduced activation of the indirect versus the direct pathway 
could, therefore, have affected the spatial distribution of activity and thus prefrontal 
signals in our data. Moreover, the striatum and the dopaminergic midbrain (but not 
the OFC) contain D2 autoreceptors and blocking these could have increased the 
availability of dopamine in the synaptic cleft. Blocking of D2 autoreceptors could, 
therefore, lead to an overall increase of DA function, and in theory would lead to a 
greater global occupation of D1 receptors, especially if D2 receptors are 
concurrently blocked by amisulpride. Finally, blocking D2 receptors could have 
shifted the tonic/phasic balance toward D1/NMDA-mediated phasic activity (Goto 
and Grace, 2005) and thus increased separation of patterns coding reward and no 
reward. 
In the current experiment, we used a simple task to ensure that behavioral 
performance was matched across groups, allowing a straightforward interpretation 
of the neural effects. In general, however, it would be interesting to test the effects 
of enhanced cortical representations on behavioral performance. For instance, if D2-
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receptor blockade decreases the ability to flexibly switch between prefrontal 
representations, amisulpride may reduce distractibility at the cost of reduced 
cognitive flexibility and increased perseveration (Mehta et al., 2004). Future 
experiments are needed to test the behavioral markers of altered prefrontal 
representations. 
Phasic increases in dopamine are thought to play a major role in motivation, 
reward processing, and RL (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Pessiglione et al., 2006; 
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Schultz, 2013). Specifically, unpredicted rewards and 
reward-predictive stimuli activate dopamine neurons (Tobler et al., 2005) and 
concomitant dopamine release in striatum and prefrontal cortex (Hart et al., 2014) 
could play a role in implementing behavioral functions. For instance, dopamine is 
thought to signal reward prediction errors that drive RL (Schultz, 2013). 
Interestingly, whereas previous studies show reduced RL when blocking dopamine 
receptors using haloperidol (Pessiglione et al., 2006), individually estimated 
learning rates of an RL model did not differ in our experiment. This is in line with 
the fact that amisulpride has generally very limited effects on behavior (Rosenzweig 
et al., 2002) and learning (Eisenegger et al., 2014), and corroborates the notion that 
many of the reinforcing effects of dopamine arise only when both D1 and D2 
receptors are stimulated (Wise, 2006). 
Of note, amisulpride is one of the few relatively selective drugs affecting 
dopaminergic neurotransmission available for human use. However, D3 and 5-HT7 
receptors are also modulated by amisulpride. The D3 receptor belongs to the D2-
like family of dopaminergic receptors, activation of which inhibits the formation of 
cAMP. Thus, it is likely that D3-receptor activation also opposes D1-receptor 
activation (which facilitates cAMP formation), along with comparable effects on the 
strength of prefrontal representations. In contrast, very little is known about the 
effects of 5-HT7 receptor activation on cognitive functioning, except for a role in 
memory formation, sleep, and psychiatric disorders (Gasbarri and Pompili, 2014). 
In general, however, the neuromodulator serotonin (5-HT) has been suggested to 
play a role in punishment processing and aversive learning (Cools et al., 2008), and 
has been hypothesized to act as an opponent to dopamine (Daw et al., 2002). Thus, 
given the role of 5-HT in aversive processing, we believe it is unlikely that 5-HT7-
receptors contributed to the effects of amisulpride observed in the current study. 
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In summary, here we have shown a link between dopamine and prefrontal 
signals, supporting a dual-state model of prefrontal dopamine in which the strength 
of network representations can be enhanced by blocking D2 receptors. Thus, our 
results link a theory that is derived from nonhuman animal models of dopamine 
receptor functioning to human prefrontal function. By suggesting a mechanism by 
which prefrontal representations can be manipulated, our results have important 
implications for the treatment of cognitive dysfunctions. Specifically, high doses of 
amisulpride (400–1200 mg/d) are widely used in the management of positive 
symptoms in schizophrenia (Curran and Perry, 2001), which include disordered 
thoughts and speech, hallucinations, and delusions. Such symptoms could result 
from multiple weak cognitive representations, suggesting that the enhancement of 
cognitive representations may be an important aspect of the therapeutic drug effect. 
This potential mechanism also has implications for the management of other 
psychiatric disorders that are characterized by enhanced cognitive flexibility and 
attentional deficits such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.      
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Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Task and behavioral results. A, Timing of the noninstrumental outcome 
prediction task. Locations of response options on the response mapping screen were 
randomized across trials. B, Different cue-outcome pairs were used to control for 
visual features of cues and outcomes. C, Percentage of correctly predicted outcomes 
for amisulpride (Ami) and placebo (Pla) group across time (bins of 4 trials each). 
Because three response options are provided in each trial, chance level is 33%. D, 
Percentage of correctly predicted no reward (noRew) and reward (Rew) outcomes. 
Error bars depict 95% CIs. 
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Figure 2. Effects of D2-receptor blockade on reward signals. A, Schematic of the 
searchlight decoding approach. Activity patterns were extracted for all four cue-
outcome pairs from each searchlight. An SVC model was trained to discriminate 
reward from no reward on set I only or set II only. This yielded predictions that were 
then tested on the other set (testing on set II after training on set I and vice versa) 
to obtain decoding accuracy, which was assigned to the center voxel. This procedure 
was repeated for every searchlight (center voxel) in the entire brain, resulting in a 
3D map of decoding accuracy. B, Cluster in the medial OFC with significantly (pFWE-
corr< 0.05) higher decoding accuracy in the amisulpride (Ami) than placebo (Pla) 
group. C, For illustration purposes, bar plots depict averaged decoding accuracy 
from individual peak searchlights in the OFC cluster for both groups. Error bars 
depict 95% CI. 
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Figure 3. Amisulpride enhances pattern separation in the OFC. A, Bar plots 
depict average squared difference between activity patterns related to reward and 
no reward. Asterisk depicts significant two-sample t test at p < 0.05 (one-tailed). 
Error bars depict SEM. B, Squared difference between activity patterns related to 
reward and no reward for a representative subject in the amisulpride group (Ami; 
left) and in the placebo group (Pla; right). Each pixel represents the squared 
difference (reward minus no reward) in the activity of one voxel in the medial OFC. 
The color map represents squared activity difference and is min − max scaled across 
both displayed patterns. The two subjects were selected such that their average 
squared pattern difference is close to the mean of their respective group 
(amisulpride subject = 0.55 [amisulpride group average = 0.57], placebo subject = 
0.43 [placebo group average = 0.42]). 
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Figure 4. Effects of D2-receptor blockade on reward signals in anatomical 
ROIs. A, Anatomically defined ROIs in the orbitofrontal cortex derived from the 
automated anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas. B, Difference in decoding accuracy for 
reward between groups [amisulpride (Ami) − placebo (Pla)]. Asterisk depicts 
significant two-sample t tests at p < 0.05 (one-tailed). Error bars depict 95% CI. 
Medial OFC, mOFC; central OFC, cOFC; lateral OFC, lOFC. 
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Figure 5. Effects of D2-receptor blockade on motor signals. Coronal (A), sagittal 
(B), and transversal (C) slices depicting a cluster in motor cortex with significantly 
higher decoding accuracy for motor response (finger of right hand was used for 
behavioral response) in the amisulpride (Ami) compared with the placebo (Pla) 
group. D, For illustration purposes, bar plots depict averaged decoding accuracy 
from individual peak searchlights in the cluster for both groups. Error bars depict 
95% CI. 
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Table 1. Brain regions with higher decoding accuracy for reward in the 
amisulpride > placebo group. 
  MNI 
Coordinate 
      
Region x y z       T k 
voxels 
Medial OFC −3 35 −23 6,07 186 
Left dorsolateral PFC −27 14 55 4,04 115 
Dorsomedial PFC −6 41 49 3,76 60 
Left ventrolateral PFC −30 50 1 3,74 27 
Right inferior TC 54 −43 −8 3,98 40 
Left inferior TC −33 −43 −23 3,95 42 
 
Results thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected (k > 15). TC, temporal cortex. 
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Abstract 
 
Increased responding to drug-associated stimuli (cue reactivity) and an inability to 
tolerate delayed gratification (reward impulsivity) have been implicated in the 
development and maintenance of drug addiction. While data from animal studies 
suggest that both the dopamine and opioid system are involved in these two reward-
related processes, their role in humans is less clear. Moreover, dopaminergic and 
opioidergic drugs have not been directly compared with regard to these functions, 
even though a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms might inform 
the development of specific treatments for elevated cue reactivity and reward 
impulsivity. In a randomized, double-blind, between-subject design we 
administered the selective dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist amisulpride 
(400mg, n=41), the unspecific opioid receptor antagonist naltrexone (50mg, n=40), 
or placebo (n=40) to healthy humans and measured cue-induced responding with a 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task and reward impulsivity with a delay 
discounting task. Mood was assessed using a visual analog scale. Compared to 
placebo, amisulpride significantly suppressed cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity. The effects of naltrexone were similar, although less pronounced. Both 
amisulpride and naltrexone decreased average mood ratings compared to placebo. 
Our results demonstrate that a selective blockade of dopamine D2/D3 receptors 
reduces cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity in healthy humans. 
Antagonizing μ-opioid receptors has similar effects for cue-induced responding and 
to a lesser extent for reward impulsivity. 
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Introduction 
 
Substance addiction is characterized by uncontrolled drug use, drug craving, and a 
high incidence of relapse even after years of abstinence. Cue reactivity and reward 
impulsivity are two core features of addiction that play an important role in the 
development and maintenance of drug addiction as well as relapse (Drummond, 
2000). Cue reactivity refers to the ability of drug associated stimuli to increase 
responding to those drug cues in addiction. It is often used to explain why patients 
with addiction use drugs and relapse at a higher rate in environments that have been 
associated with prior drug use. Objects and environments that are paired with drug 
use become conditioned stimuli capable of independently triggering instrumental 
drug-seeking behaviors (Drummond, 2000). Not surprisingly, elevated cue-
reactivity is consistently found in substance use disorders (Everitt et al., 2001; 
O'Brien et al., 1998). Reward impulsivity is defined as the inability to delay 
gratification and wait for a larger reward, in the face of a smaller immediate reward 
(Hulka et al., 2014). Increased reward impulsivity has been suggested as a stable 
marker (endophenotype) of addiction (Hulka et al., 2014; Hulka et al., 2015; De Wit, 
2009; MacKillop et al., 2011) and may explain the reduced ability of affected 
individuals to refrain from taking drugs even when continued use is associated with 
high personal and financial costs.  
Since both cue reactivity and reward impulsivity are important factors in 
drug addiction, understanding their underlying neurochemistry may provide key 
insights into drug abuse and relapse. Two neurotransmitter systems have been 
particularly implicated in addiction – the dopamine and the opioid system (Berridge 
and Robinson, 2011). Opioid receptor agonists and antagonists are commonly 
prescribed to reduce craving and to prevent relapse in opioid dependence and other 
forms of substance addiction (Quednow and Herdener, in press). On the other hand, 
in animal models, most addictive drugs increase dopamine levels in the nucleus 
accumbens (Di Chiara and Bassareo, 2007) which has been confirmed in humans for 
stimulant drugs, alcohol, and nicotine (Nutt et al., 2015). Moreover, stimulant-
addicted individuals show a blunted dopamine response to acute challenges with 
stimulants, but increased dopamine release in response to sensory cues associated 
with drug use (Volkow et al., 2012). It is therefore of high interest to understand 
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how cue reactivity and reward impulsivity are commonly and differentially 
influenced by dopamine and opioid blockade.  
Here, we investigate the pharmacological basis of cue reactivity and reward 
impulsivity in healthy volunteers. The use of healthy volunteers to study how 
reward processing may be altered in addiction offers several important benefits. 
Firstly, it makes human studies comparable to the numerous animal studies that 
mainly use pharmacological manipulations on healthy animal subjects. Secondly, 
using healthy volunteers makes it easier to interpret the results of the 
pharmacological intervention, since it dissociates drug effects from disorder effects 
and is not complicated by interactions between drug and disorder. Thirdly, patients 
with substance use disorders often have comorbidities and are treated with 
psychotropic medications that potentially interact with experimental drug 
challenge effects. In the current study, we probe the effect of dopamine and opioid 
receptor antagonists in a Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) task and a delay 
discounting task. PIT is a common measure of cue-induced responding (cue 
reactivity) that has been used in numerous animal studies and has also been applied 
to humans (Holmes et al., 2010). It measures the ability of a previously rewarded 
conditioned stimulus to trigger instrumental responding even in the absence of any 
rewards. PIT tasks usually employ a three phase design: In an instrumental and a 
Pavlovian phase, an instrumental response to earn reward is acquired and a 
Pavlovian conditioned stimulus predicting reward is learned. During the critical test 
phase, which measures PIT/cue-induced responding, the conditioned stimulus is 
displayed in the absence of rewards and instrumental responding is recorded. The 
ability of the conditioned stimulus to elicit instrumental responding during the test 
phase is considered a model of how drug-associated stimuli can trigger drug seeking 
behavior (Everitt and Robbins, 2005). Reward impulsivity is often measured using 
delay discounting tasks (Hulka et al., 2014; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby and Petry, 2004). 
In these tasks participants choose between smaller immediate rewards and larger 
delayed rewards, and reward impulsivity is characterized by an increased 
preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards i.e. higher 
discounting (Hulka et al., 2014; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby and Petry, 2004).  
In separate studies, PIT and delay discounting have been linked to the 
dopamine system (delay discounting: e.g. De Wit et al., 2002; Floresco et al., 2008; 
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Pine et al., 2010; PIT: e.g. Dickinson et al., 2000; Hebart and Gläscher, 2015; Lex and 
Hauber, 2008; Ostlund and Maidment, 2012; Wassum et al., 2011) and the opioid 
system (delay discounting: e.g. Kieres et al., 2004; Love et al., 2009; Pattij et al., 2009; 
PIT: e.g. Laurent et al., 2012; Peciña and Berridge, 2013). However, the previous 
results are primarily from animal studies (for a non-exhaustive overview see Table 
1) and often contradictory, because various and relatively unselective challenge 
drugs have been used. Additionally, the rare human studies (Table 1) have mostly 
tested rather small samples. More importantly, no study directly compared 
dopaminergic and opioidergic drug challenges on reward impulsivity and cue-
induced responding. 
To fill this gap, we investigated the role of the dopamine and opioid system 
in cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity by administering the highly 
selective D2/D3 receptor antagonist amisulpride, the non-selective opioid 
antagonist naltrexone and placebo in a randomized, double-blind, between-subject 
design in healthy volunteers. We used 400 mg amisulpride and 50 mg naltrexone 
administered orally, a standard dosage with only minor side-effects in several 
previous studies (Murray et al., 2014; Rosenzweig et al., 2002).  
 
 
Methods and Materials 
 
Participants 
A total of 121 healthy volunteers, recruited from the Laboratory for Social and 
Neural Systems Research subject pool, participated in the study. The sample size was 
chosen based on previous literature and in order to obtain a statistical power of 80% 
for detecting significant differences between drug conditions (Rosenzweig et al., 
2002). All participants were screened by the recruitment team to ensure they were 
physically and psychiatrically healthy. Specific exclusion criteria were a history of 
brain disease or injury, surgery to head or heart, neurological or psychiatric diseases 
(including alcoholism, depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, claustrophobia, 
or Parkinson symptoms), a severe medical disease such as diabetes, cancer, 
insufficiency of liver or kidneys, acute hepatitis, high or low blood pressure, any 
cardiovascular incidences, epilepsy, pregnancy or breastfeeding, past use of opiates 
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or other drugs that may interact with amisulpride or naltrexone (such as 
stimulants). Illegal drug use (amphetamines, barbiturates, buprenorphine, 
benzodiazepines, cannabis, cocaine, MDMA, methadone, morphine/opiates) was 
controlled by drug urine testing (M-10/5-DT, Diagnostik Nord, Schwerin, Germany) 
and cardiac health was confirmed by an electrocardiogram. All participants 
provided written informed consent. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Canton of Zurich and registered on www.clinicaltrials.gov 
(NCT02557984). 
 
Procedure 
On average 3h (+/-1.10 min, SEM) before the experimental tasks, participants 
received a pill containing either placebo (N=40), 400 mg amisulpride (N=41), or 50 
mg naltrexone (N=40) in a randomized and double-blind fashion (Figure S1). 
Randomization was performed in blocks of 9 participants by the study pharmacist. 
Amisulpride is a selective dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist, while naltrexone is 
an unspecific opioid receptor antagonist which acts primarily on the μ- and κ-opioid 
receptors, with lesser and more variable effects on δ-opioid receptors (Weerts et al., 
2008; Rosenzweig et al., 2002). The two active doses were chosen to result in 
comparable neurochemical responses. While 400mg amisulpride usually result in 
~50-80% D2 receptor occupancy (Vernaleken et al., 2004; Bressan et al., 2004; La 
Fougère et al., 2005; Meisenzahl et al., 2008), 50mg naltrexone normally cause >90% 
mu-opioid receptor occupancy (Weerts et al., 2008; Weerts et al., 2013). As D2 
receptor occupancies  of >90% are only attainable with amisulpride doses of 800mg 
or higher (Vernaleken et al., 2004; La Fougère et al., 2005; Meisenzahl et al., 2008), 
we nevertheless decided to compare 400mg amisulpride and 50mg naltrexone – 
doses which are both well tolerated in healthy subjects (Murray et al., 2014; 
Rosenzweig et al., 2002) – in order to avoid extrapyramidal side effects potentially 
associated with higher amisulpride doses. To enhance and equate absorption time 
across participants, all participants were asked not to eat for 6h before arrival. After 
task completion, participants answered post experimental questionnaires, which 
probed whether they thought they had received a drug or placebo and also 
measured their mood (one rating was not recorded in the placebo group). Using high 
performance liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, amisulpride and 
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naltrexone blood plasma levels immediately before and after the behavioral tasks 
were determined in order to control for absorption of the drugs (amisulpride before: 
618 µg/L, after: 915 µg/L, mean: 767 µg/L; naltrexone before: 2.98 µg/L, after: 2.50 
µg/L, mean: 2.74 µg/L). There was no correlation between blood plasma level and 
task performance (PIT: |r|<0.20, p>0.24, Namisulpride=35, Nnaltrexone=34; DD: |r|<0.15, 
p>0.36, Namisulpride=40, Nnaltrexone=40). 
 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task 
The PIT task (duration: 23.46 min +/-0.42) followed the standard three-phase PIT 
design (please refer to the supplement for a more detailed description) according to 
the protocol of Lovibond and Colagiuri (2013). Initially, in the instrumental 
conditioning phase, participants needed to press a button in order to earn a 
chocolate M&M reward on a variable-ratio 10 schedule. Subsequently, in the 
Pavlovian phase, a differential-conditioning procedure was used in which an 
appetitively conditioned stimulus (CS+) was always paired with the delivery of a 
chocolate M&M reward, whereas a neutral stimulus (CS-) was always presented 
with no outcome. Lastly, participants completed the transfer-test phase, where no 
rewards were available. Both the CS+ and the CS- were presented twice for 10 sec in 
random order, while button-presses were recorded (Figure S2). Before and after the 
task, participants were asked to indicate their desire for M&Ms, in order to control 
for hunger levels. Using the same standard as in the previous study (Lovibond and 
Colagiuri, 2013), 2 placebo, 6 amisulpride, and 6 naltrexone participants did not 
meet the criterion of the instrumental phase and were therefore excluded from the 
PIT analysis. For an overview of excluded subjects for each task, please refer to      
Table S1. 
 
Delay discounting task 
After the PIT task, participants completed the Kirby (1999) Monetary Choice 
Questionnaire to measure delay discounting (duration: 1.8 min +/-0.04). The 
questionnaire consisted of 27 hypothetical decisions in which participants chose 
between a smaller, immediate monetary reward and a larger, delayed monetary 
reward. It included nine questions for each of three delayed reward magnitudes 
(small, medium and large). The monetary rewards varied between 11 CHF and 80 
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CHF for immediate rewards, and between 25 CHF and 85 CHF for delayed rewards. 
The delays of the delayed reward varied between 7 and 186 days. One female subject 
in the amisulpride group did not complete the delay discounting task and was 
therefore excluded from all analyses of this task.  
 
Assessment of affect, mood, and trait impulsivity 
Before drug administration participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) in order to measure trait impulsivity, the short version 
of the Action Regulating Emotion Systems (ARES) questionnaire (Hartig and 
Moosbrugger, 2003) to check for differences in the Behavioral Inhibition and the 
Behavioral Activation System scales (BIS/BAS), as well as the Affect Intensity 
Measure (AIM; Larsen and Diener, 1987) to assess affective responsiveness. 
After the behavioral tasks, participants rated their current mood on the 
computer using a visual analog scale that ranged from 0 (very bad mood) to 100 
(very good mood). They were instructed to “please mark on the scale how you feel 
right now.” 
 
Statistical Analysis 
To assess whether our groups differed in age, body mass index (BMI), years of 
education, trait impulsivity, BIS/BAS score, and affect intensity, we conducted one-
way ANOVAs with these measures. Additionally, we performed a Chi-Square 
analysis of whether the subject correctly guessed if they received a medication or 
placebo. 
In order to assess Pavlovian and instrumental learning, we analyzed the 
performance of the groups in the first two phases of the PIT task, using one-way 
ANOVAs with the between-subject factor drug group. Specifically, we compared the 
number and frequency of button-presses, the time participants took to reach the 
criterion for the instrumental phase, and the ratings of the reward contingencies for 
the Pavlovian phase. For the main analysis of interest, we focused on differences in 
the number of button-presses during the transfer-test phase. We normalized the 
button-presses during the CS test phase by the number of responses during the 
initial extinction period of the transfer-test phase. However, the results did not 
change when the raw (non-normalized) data was used and the groups did not differ 
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significantly in button-pressing during the extinction period (Table S2). In order to 
probe the cue-related increase in instrumental responding, we compared button-
presses during the 10 sec CS presentation with the button-presses in the 10 sec 
before the CS presentation for CS+ versus CS-. We performed a mixed-model ANOVA 
to compare the two drug groups with the placebo group, with group as the between 
subject factor and CS-type and time as the within subject factors. Significant findings 
(p<.05) were followed by post hoc t-test analyses. 
For the delay discounting task, we measured how often participants chose 
the smaller immediate reward, as opposed to the larger delayed reward to estimate 
reward discounting. More frequent choice of immediate rewards corresponds to 
stronger discounting. This use of the proportion of immediate rewards chosen 
allowed us to analyze the discounting behavior without relying on assumptions 
about the shape of the discounting curve for the individual participants (Myerson et 
al., 2014). However, using Kirby’s estimation to determine the k values of the 
individuals (Kirby et al., 1999) or using logistic regression (Wileyto et al., 2004) did 
not change the pattern of results (Table S3). The proportion of immediate rewards 
chosen for each of the three groups was contrasted using a one-way ANOVA for all 
rewards, as well as a repeated-measures ANOVA to include the within subject factor 
reward magnitude. As with the PIT task, significant findings (p<.05) were followed 
by post hoc t-test analyses. 
Additionally, using Pearson correlations we investigated how closely related 
the behaviors of the participants in the two tasks were and, in an exploratory 
analysis, how mood was related to the performance in the tasks. 
 
 
Results 
 
The three groups did not differ in age, BMI, years of education, trait impulsivity, 
BIS/BAS scores, and affect intensity (one-way ANOVAs, all F(2,118)<1.86, p>0.16; 
Table S4). Furthermore, participants were unaware whether they received one of 
the drugs or placebo, as assessed by post experimental questionnaires (χ2(1)=1.00, 
p=.32).  
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PIT 
To assess cue-induced responding, we compared the number of button-presses 
during the transfer test phase. Contrasting CS-induced button-presses against pre-
CS responding revealed a significant effect of time (F(1,104)=5.99, p<.05). There was 
also a significant main effect of CS type, with the rewarded CS increasing button-
presses in contrast to the unrewarded CS (F(1,104)=18.54, p<.0001). Moreover, in 
line with a transfer effect, CS type interacted with time (F(1,104)=11.17, p<.001), 
that is button-presses increased specifically during the CS+ presentation. 
Importantly, we found a group*CS type*time interaction (F(2,104)=3.75, p<.05), 
indicating that there were differences between our drug and placebo groups. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, in the placebo group button-presses increased during the CS+ 
presentation as opposed to the ten seconds prior to the CS presentation. Both drug 
groups showed less of an increase in button-pressing during the CS+ than the 
placebo group (Figure 1d-f). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that for the placebo group the 
difference between button-pressing during the CS+ presentation was significantly 
higher than pre CS+ presentation (t(37)=3.68, p<.005), as well as significantly 
higher than during the CS- presentation (t(37)=5.35, p<.001). This was not the case 
for the amisulpride and naltrexone groups (amisulpride: pre CS+ vs. CS+: 
t(34)=0.62, p=0.54; CS+ vs. CS-: t(34)=1.66, p=0.11; naltrexone: pre CS+ vs. CS+: 
t(33)=1.92, p=0.06; CS+ vs. CS-: t(33)=2.03, p=0.05). Furthermore, in both drug 
groups, the difference between button-pressing for the rewarded and unrewarded 
CSs during CS presentation was significantly reduced compared to the placebo 
group (amisulpride vs. placebo: t(71)=3.01, p<.01; naltrexone vs. placebo: 
t(70)=2.13, p<.05). There was no significant difference between the two drug groups 
(amisulpride vs. naltrexone: t(67)=0.60, p=.55). Thus, cue-induced responding was 
reduced by both amisulpride and naltrexone. 
To assess whether the groups differed in how much they desired M&M’s 
before or after the PIT task and in order to rule this out as a potential confound for 
subsequent analyses, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA, which indicated 
that there was no significant main effect of group (F(2,104)=0.20, p=.82). Thus, the 
drugs did not impact desire for chocolate as such. Although the mean desire for 
chocolate across groups decreased from 83.9 (pre-test) to 67.3 (post-test), in all 
three groups it remained significantly larger than 50, the midpoint of the scale 
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(placebo: t(37)=4.68, p<.001; amisulpride: t(34)=3.10, p<.01; naltrexone: 
t(33)=2.98, p<.01). 
In order to test whether the groups differed in their performance during the 
instrumental or Pavlovian phases, we also compared their responding and learning 
during these phases (Table S2). Participants took on average 2.5 min (+/-0.22 SEM) 
to complete the instrumental training and performed 113 (+/-0.86) button-presses, 
or 1.33 (+/-0.08) button-presses per second. There were no significant differences 
in the number of button-presses (F(2,104)=0.85, p=.43), the frequency of button-
presses (F(2,104)=0.08, p=.92), or the time until criterion (F(2,104)=0.41, p=.66). 
Similarly, in the Pavlovian acquisition phase, there were no differences between the 
groups in how well they learned the Pavlovian contingencies of the task 
(F(2,104)=2.08, p=.13). Overall, it seems that while the three groups did not differ 
in their desire for chocolate or their performance during the instrumental and 
Pavlovian acquisition phase, they differed in their behavior during the transfer-test 
phase. Thus, while learning and desire were unaffected by the pharmacological 
manipulation, cue-induced responding was reduced. 
 
Delay Discounting 
To test whether the dopamine and opioid receptor ligands affected reward 
impulsivity, we compared the performance of the three groups during the delay 
discounting task. The groups differed significantly in the proportion of immediate 
rewards chosen (F(2,117)=3.18, p<.05; Figure 2a). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the 
amisulpride group chose the smaller immediate rewards significantly less often 
than the placebo group (t(78)=2.58, p<.01). The difference between the naltrexone 
and the placebo group did not reach significance (t(78)=1.70, p=.09). These data 
were largely the same when reward magnitude was included as an additional factor 
in the analysis. Again, we found a main effect of group (F(2,117)=3.18, p<.05), but 
also a main effect of reward magnitude (F(2,116)=91.03, p<.0001; Figure 2b), as 
well as a significant reward magnitude*group interaction (F(4,234)=2.44, p<.05). T-
tests indicated that the amisulpride group chose a lower proportion of immediate 
rewards than the placebo group for all reward magnitudes (small rewards: 
t(78)=2.02, p<.05; medium rewards: t(78)=2.32, p<.05; large rewards: t(78)=3.17, 
p<.01). In contrast, although none of the comparisons reached significance, the 
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difference between naltrexone and placebo participants was highest for small and 
medium rewards (small rewards: t(78)=1.65, p=.102; medium rewards: t(78)=1.84, 
p=.07; large rewards: t(78)=1.43, p=.16). There were no significant differences 
between the two drug groups. Overall, it seems that both pharmacological 
manipulations led to a reduction in discounting, with the strongest effects for the 
amisulpride challenge and a non-significant trend for the naltrexone challenge.  
 
Relation between tasks 
Although the drugs elicited similar effects on both tasks, there was no significant 
correlation between the PIT effect and the proportion of immediate rewards chosen 
(r=0.15, p=.14, N=106; Figure 3). Thus, the two tasks seem to measure different 
aspects of reward-guided behavior. 
 
Mood 
Finally, in an exploratory analysis, we tested if individual differences in mood might 
have influenced cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed that the three groups differed in mood (F(2,116)=3.44, p<.05). The mood 
of the amisulpride group was not significantly different from the mood of the 
naltrexone group (t(78)=0.56, p=.58), but both drug groups showed lower mood 
ratings than the placebo group (placebo: 67.59 (+/-2.80 SEM); amisulpride: 58.96 
(+/-3.00 SEM); naltrexone: 56.30 (+/-3.63 SEM); amisulpride: t(77)=0.21, p<.05; 
naltrexone: t(77)=0.25, p<.05). We, therefore, re-performed all main analyses of 
group differences in cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity as ANCOVAs, 
using mood as a covariate, which produced similar results. In an exploratory 
correlation analysis, we also investigated the influence of mood on our two 
behavioral tasks. There were no significant correlations between mood and 
behavioral outcomes in the PIT task, however, the impact of mood on delay 
discounting differed between the three groups. While there was no correlation in 
the placebo group, elevated mood went along with a greater number of immediate 
rewards chosen in the amisulpride group (Figure S3). In contrast, this relationship 
was reversed for the naltrexone group, where mood correlated negatively with the 
proportion of immediate rewards chosen. For statistics, please refer to the 
supplementary results. 
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Discussion 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to contrast the effect of dopamine and opioid 
receptor blockade on PIT and delay discounting in healthy volunteers. Our data 
confirm the critical role of dopamine in both cue-induced responding and reward 
impulsivity in humans by showing that dopamine D2/D3 receptor blockade with 
amisulpride reduced the motivation to obtain immediate rewards in both a 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task and a delay discounting task. A blockade of μ- 
and κ-opioid receptors with naltrexone had similar albeit less pronounced effects 
on cue-induced responding, as well as a non-significant trend reduction in reward 
impulsivity. While both substances reduced mood, they differently affected the 
relation between mood and delay discounting. Under amisulpride, increased reward 
impulsivity was correlated with positive mood whereas in the naltrexone group it 
was associated with negative mood, suggesting that mood might be an important 
modulator of relapse risk under addiction treatment with dopamine and opioid 
antagonists. 
 
Cue-induced responding 
We found that amisulpride reduced cue-induced responding as measured by PIT. 
These results concur with animal studies showing that an inactivation of the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA), which likely decreased dopaminergic activity in the nucleus 
accumbens, reduced PIT (Corbit et al., 2007; Murschall and Hauber, 2006). 
Moreover, systemic administration and microinjections in the nucleus accumbens 
of dopamine receptors antagonists impair the general form of PIT (Dickinson et al., 
2000; Lex and Hauber, 2008), whereas intra-accumbal microinjections of the 
indirect dopamine agonist amphetamine facilitate general PIT (Peciña et al., 2006; 
Wyvell and Berridge, 2000). Only a single human study has recently investigated the 
effects of a manipulation of the dopamine system on PIT: Hebart and Gläscher 
(2015) reported that a dietary depletion of the dopamine precursors tyrosine and 
phenylalanine reduces appetitive PIT, which is in line with our results. However, 
depletion of tyrosine/phenylalanine not only decreases dopamine but also 
noradrenaline synthesis (Booij et al., 2003) and therefore the challenge has less 
 127 
specific effects on the dopamine system compared to the selective dopamine D2/D3 
receptor antagonist amisulpride used in the present study. 
The μ- and κ-opioid receptor antagonist naltrexone decreased PIT as well. 
This finding is in accordance with the report that both a stimulation of dopamine 
release by amphetamine as well as a stimulation of μ-opioid receptors by DAMGO 
microinjection in the nucleus accumbens increased cue-triggered levels of 
motivation to pursue sucrose reward in the PIT (Peciña and Berridge, 2013). 
Moreover, μ-opioid receptor knock-out mice showed normal PIT while δ-opioid 
receptor knock-out mice were impaired. Similar effects were observed when μ- or 
δ-opioid receptor antagonists were injected into the nucleus accumbens (Laurent et 
al., 2012). One human study has investigated opioid effects on cue reactivity in non-
treatment seeking alcoholics (Myrick et al., 2008). The same dosage of naltrexone as 
used in the current study, over a 7-day period, produced no changes in craving, but 
led to a reduction in alcohol cue induced neural activation in the ventral striatum. 
Our findings extend these results to healthy participants, separate the drug effect 
from the disorder effect, and thereby provide a clearer picture of opioid effects on 
cue-induced responding. 
 
Reward impulsivity 
Our finding of reduced reward impulsivity under amisulpride is in line with previous 
animal studies showing that the indirect dopamine agonists amphetamine (Evenden 
and Ryan, 1996; Helms et al., 2006) and cocaine (Logue et al., 1992) increase reward 
impulsivity, although also contradictory results exist (Wade et al., 2000). Moreover, 
one small human study (n=13) has also revealed increased reward impulsivity with 
indirect catecholamine agonism by L-DOPA (Pine et al., 2010; but see De Wit et al., 
2002  for opposing results with amphetamine, as well as Hamidovic et al., 2008 for 
null effects using oramipexole), but found no effect with the unselective dopamine 
antagonist haloperidol. Our results add to this literature by showing that selective 
blockade of D2/D3 receptors can reduce reward impulsivity. 
Reward impulsivity was moderately reduced by naltrexone, although the 
reduction did not reach significance. Only few studies have investigated the effects 
of opioid challenges on reward impulsivity in humans and animals. For example, in 
one animal study, the μ-opioid receptor agonist morphine dose-dependently 
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increased reward impulsivity, while naltrexone alone did not affect the value of 
delayed rewards but blocked the effects of morphine (Kieres et al., 2004). Two very 
small human studies showed no significant effects of naltrexone on reward 
impulsivity (9 abstinent alcoholics and 9 healthy controls (Mitchell et al., 2007); 9 
abstinent alcoholics and 10 healthy controls (Boettiger et al., 2009)). Interestingly, 
a PET study using a μ-opioid receptor selective radiotracer revealed that individuals 
with high trait impulsivity showed elevated density of μ-opioid receptors in regions 
underpinning reward impulsivity, such as the nucleus accumbens and the amygdala 
(Love et al., 2009). 
It is important to note that the primary effects of amisulpride and naltrexone 
on reward impulsivity, cue-induced responding, and even mood were relatively 
similar. This is in line with the recently reported common involvement of the 
dopamine and the opioid system in the direct control of drug “wanting” behavior 
(Peciña and Berridge, 2013). On the other hand, naltrexone has been shown to block 
dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens, induced e.g., by alcohol (Benjamin et 
al., 1993) or feeding (Taber et al., 1998). Indeed, the mesolimbic opioid and 
dopamine systems appear to be closely linked. For example, opiates inhibit 
GABAergic interneurons in the midbrain and thereby disinhibit dopamine neurons 
(Chartoff and Connery, 2014; Lüscher and Malenka, 2011). Consequently, 
naltrexone may have influenced behavior indirectly by a modulation of accumbal 
dopamine release. Invasive methods would be required to completely disentangle 
the direct from the dopamine-mediated impact of opioid receptor stimulation and 
blockade on reward impulsivity. However, the observation that the two drug 
challenges differentially affected the relation between mood and reward impulsivity 
is more in line with independent actions of naltrexone rather than actions that are 
mediated through an effect on dopamine neurons.  
 
 
Mood effects 
On average, the mood of the amisulpride and of the naltrexone group was lower than 
the mood of the placebo group. This effect is plausible for naltrexone, for which 
dysphoria has been reported as a common side-effect (Crowley et al., 1985), 
however, the negative mood effect of amisulpride is surprising given that the 
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compound has been shown to be an effective antidepressant (Montgomery, 2002). 
While these differences could not account for our findings when we included mood 
as a covariate, it is worth noting that more positive mood has previously been 
associated with increased reward impulsivity (Cyders et al., 2007). Conversely, 
anhedonia is associated with reduced reward impulsivity (Lempert and Pizzagalli, 
2010) and reduced willingness to exert effort for reward (Hartmann et al., 2015). 
More importantly, we found that both drug challenges exerted opposite effects on 
the relation between mood and reward impulsivity but had no effects on the relation 
between mood and cue-induced responding. This finding, together with the absence 
of a relation between cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity across the 
total study sample (Figure 3), suggests that cue reactivity and reward impulsivity 
may reflect distinct reward processes (see also supplementary discussion). It is 
conceivable that cue-induced responding is more strongly related to stimulus-
induced value prediction whereas reward impulsivity may reflect a bias of 
immediate rewards on the computation of decision value. 
 
Limitations 
The following limitations should be kept in mind when considering our study. 1) 
Given that the PIT task cannot reasonably be repeated within an individual, we 
employed a between-subject design, although a within-subject design would have 
been advantageous regarding the reliability of the results. However, we aimed to 
compensate this limitation by investigating relatively large samples. 2) In order to 
maximize the number of subjects in each group, we only tested single doses of the 
two blockers. Varying the dosage may provide information about the relative 
influence of the dopamine and opioid system on cue-induced responding and 
reward impulsivity. 3) Amisulpride blocks not only dopamine D2/3 receptors but 
also 5-HT7 receptors (Abbas et al., 2009). In this regard it is worth noting that acute 
serotonin (tryptophan) depletion reduces reactivity to aversive cues, but has no 
effects on appetitive cues in general versions of PIT (Geurts et al., 2013), which 
together with our results is in line with the notion that the dopamine and the 
serotonin systems play opposing roles in appetitive and aversive value processing. 
4) The version of our PIT task does not allow to distinguish general forms of cue-
induced responding from outcome-specific forms (Burke et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 
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2013). This permits only limited comparisons to animal studies that differentiate 
between these two types of PIT.  5) Our measure of mood as a single item question 
at the end of the study provides only a global measure of mood state. Future studies 
should, therefore, apply a more sensitive measure of mood and measure baseline 
mood, in order to confirm the relationship between mood and reward impulsivity 
and the modulatory effects of naltrexone.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Although animal research provided promising findings (Parish et al., 2005), the 
efficacy of dopamine receptor antagonists for the treatment of addiction in humans 
appears to be limited (Quednow and Herdener, in press). Our data suggest that it 
may be worth exploring the usefulness of the more specific D2/D3 dopamine 
receptor antagonist amisulpride, particularly in patients with increased reactivity to 
drug cues and elevated reward impulsivity. Moreover, it could be of interest to 
further explore the relationship of mood and reward impulsivity under naltrexone 
and amisulpride, as the individual mood of the patient could potentially prove to be 
a relevant factor when deciding between treatment with amisulpride or naltrexone. 
In conclusion, we show that the opioid system contributes to increased responding 
to reward cues, while the effects on delay discounting were less pronounced in our 
study. In contrast, the dopamine system was involved in both responding to reward 
associated cues and in delay discounting. 
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Figure 1. Button-presses during the transfer-test phase of the Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer task. a-b: Button-presses in 5-s bins before, during, and 
after presentation of the conditioned stimuli (CSs) for participants in the (a) 
placebo, (b) amisulpride and (c) naltrexone groups. The CS+ had previously been 
paired with chocolate; the CS- had not been paired with chocolate. The dotted lines 
indicate the pre-CS phase (-10 to 0 s) and the onset and offset of the CS phase (0 to 
10 s). d-f: Mean number of button-presses in the pre CS phase and the CS phase for 
participants in the (d) placebo, (e) amisulpride and (f) naltrexone groups 
(**p<.005). The CS+ is displayed in dark, the CS- in light colors. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of smaller immediate rewards chosen in the delay 
discounting task. (a) Participants in the amisulpride group chose significantly 
fewer smaller immediate rewards than those in the placebo group (*p<.05). (b) 
Choice behavior of the different groups split by high, medium and large reward 
magnitudes. Vertical error bars represent standard errors of the mean proportion 
of immediate rewards chosen; horizontal error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean reward magnitudes. Higher values indicate higher reward impulsivity. 
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Figure 3. Absence of correlation between performance in the delay 
discounting task and the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task. Participants 
who choose more immediate rewards did not show a proportionate increase in 
button-pressing during the rewarded conditioned stimulus presentation (r=0.15, 
p=.14, N=106). Placebo participants are displayed in blue, amisulpride participants 
in green and naltrexone participants in red.  
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Table 1. Human and selected animal studies investigating the role of dopamine and 
opioid in cue-induced responding and reward impulsivity. 
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Supplementary methods 
  
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer task 
The Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) task probes the ability of Pavlovian 
stimuli to increase instrumental reward responding even in the absence of any 
rewards. Accordingly, it is used to investigate reward-related behaviors, such as 
eating, drinking and drug taking, which are triggered by cues associated with drug 
or non-drug rewards. Controlled by Cogent software, a Med Associates M&M 
dispenser [Model ENV-702, St. Albans, VT] delivered individual M&M chocolates 
into a small bowl easily accessible to participants (Figure S1). To prevent auditory 
conditioning to the sounds made by the dispenser, participants wore headphones 
emitting constant 72-dB white noise. Before and after the task, as well as at the end 
of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate their desire for chocolate on 
a visual analogue scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much): “Please mark on the 
scale how much you would want to eat M&Ms right now”.  
The PIT task followed a standard design according to the protocol of 
Lovibond and Colagiuri (2013), with an instrumental conditioning phase, a 
Pavlovian conditioning phase, and a transfer-test phase. In the instrumental phase, 
participants were instructed to press the space bar on their keyboard to earn 
chocolates. They received the following instructions: “During the first part of the 
experiment, you can press the space bar to obtain chocolates. You will need to press 
the space bar multiple times to earn each chocolate. You can press the space bar as 
much or as little as you wish. When you receive chocolate, please eat it. You can start 
pressing the space bar as soon as these instructions disappear.” We used a variable-
ratio (VR) 10 schedule, where on average 10 button-presses of the space bar 
(range=5–15) were required before a chocolate was delivered. For the first three 
rewards, fixed ratio schedules 2, 4, and 6 were used to induce button-pressing in 
participants. During the delivery of every chocolate reward, the word “chocolate” 
appeared in the center of the screen for 1 second. Additionally, for every button-
press, a small black square appeared in the center of the screen for 0.1 seconds. Any 
participant that had not obtained at least five rewards in the first 5 minutes of the 
task was informed that they might have to press the space bar more than once in 
order to earn chocolate. The instrumental-acquisition phase completed either when 
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participants had obtained 12 rewards or once 10 minutes had passed. As in the 
previous study (Lovibond and Colagiuri, 2013), any participant who did not earn 12 
rewards did not meet the criterion for the following parts of the task and was 
excluded from further analysis. In total, two placebo subjects, six amisulpride 
subjects, and six naltrexone subjects did not meet the criterion of the instrumental 
phase and were therefore excluded from the PIT analysis.  
In the second phase, the Pavlovian phase, participants were instructed that 
they would see images on the computer screen and told not to press the space bar. 
The following instructions were displayed: “During the next part of the experiment, 
you will see some colored images and you may or may not receive chocolate. Please 
do not press the space bar during this part of the experiment.” We used a 
differential-conditioning procedure. A red and a blue stimulus (counterbalanced) 
acted as the two conditioned stimuli (CS): CS+ and CS-. Every CS was presented 6 
times for 10 seconds. The CS+ was always paired with the delivery of a chocolate 
reward, while the CS- was always presented with no outcome. The intertrial interval 
ranged from 15 to 35 seconds and trials were randomized such that no more than 
two trials of the same CS type were presented in a row.  
In the final phase, the transfer-test phase, participants were instructed that 
they could now press the space bar again: “During the next part of the experiment, 
you may press the space bar again.” In this phase, testing was carried out under 
instrumental and Pavlovian extinction, i.e., without any rewards. During the initial 2 
minutes, instrumental extinction took place. Extinction was extended for another 30 
seconds for any participants that pressed the space bar during the final 30 seconds 
of the extinction period. Once participants had stopped responding for the entire 
final 30-second period or 10 minutes had passed, the transfer test began. During the 
transfer test, the CS+ and the CS- were presented for 10 seconds in random order, 
while button presses were recorded. The two CSs were then presented again in 
random order. The intertrial interval ranged from 90 to 110 seconds. After this 
phase, participants rated how often each of the two CSs was immediately followed 
by chocolate during the second phase of the experiment, using a scale from 0 (never) 
to 100 (always). The difference between the rating for the CS+ and the rating for the 
CS- served as an index of participants’ awareness of the Pavlovian contingencies. 
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Supplementary Results 
 
Mood 
With respect to the exploratory correlation analysis, we found that while there were 
no significant correlations between mood and behavioral outcomes in the PIT task 
(|r|<0.18 ,p>0.30, Nplacebo=38, Namisulpride=35, Nnaltrexone=34), the impact of mood on 
delay discounting differed between the three groups. There was no correlation in 
the placebo group (r=0.18, p=.28, N=39), however, the amisulpride group showed a 
positive correlation between mood and the proportion of immediate rewards 
chosen in the delay discounting task (r=0.31, p<.05, N=40), while the naltrexone 
group showed a negative correlation (r=-0.36, p<.05, N=40). The comparison of the 
strength of the correlations between the three conditions using Fisher’s Test to 
compare the correlation coefficients was significant for comparisons involving 
naltrexone (placebo vs. amisulpride: p=.54; placebo vs. naltrexone: p<.05; 
amisulpride vs. naltrexone: p<.01). 
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Supplementary discussion  
 
Relation between tasks 
One interesting finding of our study is that cue-induced responding, assessed by PIT, 
and reward impulsivity, measured by the delay discounting task, did not correlate. 
Furthermore, mood differentially modulated performance in these two tasks; 
specifically, mood had no effect on performance in the PIT task, while it affected 
performance in the delay discounting task. This could suggest that the PIT and delay 
discounting tasks are not measuring the exact same process and this is noteworthy 
as it is commonly assumed that incentive salience (or wanting) measured through 
cue-induced responding in the PIT task can be equated to decision value/utility 
measured by reward impulsivity in the delay discounting task (Berridge and 
Aldridge, 2008; Monterosso et al., 2012).  
However, to our knowledge, no study in humans has directly compared 
participants’ behavior in these two tasks. Studies in humans have primarily used the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) questionnaire to measure trait impulsivity and 
reported conflicting results. While Watson and colleagues (2014) failed to find a 
correlation between trait impulsivity and the PIT transfer effect, Garofalo and 
colleagues (2015) report that participants, who were sign trackers, i.e., participants 
who unlike goal trackers focus more on the conditioned stimulus than the reward, 
had stronger PIT transfer effects as well as higher levels of trait impulsivity. It is 
important to note, however, that impulsivity is not one unified construct. Instead it 
can be parsed into at least three components: (1) self-reported  i.e., trait impulsivity 
(measured by BIS-11); (2) impulsive action (measured for example by the Stop 
Signal Task) and (3) impulsive choice (measured by delay discounting) (Broos et al., 
2012). In line with this, one animal study investigating individual differences in cue-
induced responding differentiated between impulsive action and impulsive choice, 
and found that sign trackers tend to show stronger cue-induced responding and 
impulsive action, but did not differ from goal trackers in impulsive choices in a delay 
discounting task (Lovic et al., 2011). Together, it may be that specifically impulsive 
choice differs from the incentive salience/wanting behavior measured by the PIT 
task and that decision value/utility is not directly influenced by the same processes 
that enhance cue responding. However, one should keep in mind that the absence of 
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a correlation does not in itself offer definitive proof of a dissociation between these 
two constructs, and it would be interesting to probe this further in future studies.     
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Supplementary figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Timing of the behavioral tasks. After completing questionnaires, 
participants received 400 mg amisulpride, 50 mg naltrexone or placebo in a 
randomized and double-blind fashion. After 3h (+/-1.10 min, SEM), participants 
underwent instrumental & Pavlovian training, followed by the PIT transfer test 
phase and the delay discounting task. Mood was assessed after completion of all 
tasks. Red arrows indicate blood plasma collection.  
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Figure S2. Illustration of the set-up of the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer 
task. Depiction of a participant during the transfer-test phase. A Pavlovian stimulus 
appears on the monitor, while the participant is pressing the instrumental key. 
During the prior instrumental and Pavlovian phases, M&Ms were dispensed into the 
white bowl to the left of the computer screen. 
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Figure S3. Correlations between mood ratings and the proportion of 
immediate rewards chosen in the delay discounting task. a-b The relationship 
of mood and discounting behavior was similar for participants in the (a) placebo 
and (b) amisulpride group, with mood and the number of immediate rewards 
chosen showing a positive relationship (placebo: r=.18, p=0.28, N=39; amisulpride: 
r=0.31, p<.05, N=40). (c) In contrast, for participants in the naltrexone group the 
relation was reversed, with positive mood being associated with higher propensity 
to choose delayed rewards (r=-0.36, p<.05, N=40). 
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Supplementary tables 
 
Table S1. Final number of subjects used in each analysis. 
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Table S2. Performance of the placebo, amisulpride, and naltrexone groups during 
the Instrumental and Pavlovian phase, as well as the extinction period. 
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Table S3. Delay Discounting Results using Kirby’s equation and logistic regression 
to estimate the discounting parameter k. 
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Table S4. Demographic data and questionnaire data of the placebo, amisulpride, 
and naltrexone groups. 
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